Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science 2009
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_8
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Phenomenology, Imagination and Interdisciplinary Research

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Cited by 16 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Going back to at least Hume, memory and imagination, but perhaps not perception, have been considered experiences of so-called "mental images". We agree with Husserl's point that when we remember and imagine, we don't experience pictures in the head but we experience the images as if they are of objects that are out there (Jansen, 2010). An imagined tree isn't represented as being inside your head.…”
Section: Mental Images and Experiencessupporting
confidence: 76%
“…Going back to at least Hume, memory and imagination, but perhaps not perception, have been considered experiences of so-called "mental images". We agree with Husserl's point that when we remember and imagine, we don't experience pictures in the head but we experience the images as if they are of objects that are out there (Jansen, 2010). An imagined tree isn't represented as being inside your head.…”
Section: Mental Images and Experiencessupporting
confidence: 76%
“…the specific character of phantasy. What is accomplished in and through phantasy is not picture apprehension, but rather 'simulation' of possible experience (Jansen 2010). In it we do not experience the same kind of conflict between two object apprehensions.…”
Section: Phantasy and Simulated Spatial Experiencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given that my interest here concerns the methodological role of phantasy rather than Husserl's efforts to uncover its phenomenological essence and hence distinctiveness vis-à-vis positional acts and imagistic consciousness-and given that my overarching aim is to bring out the continuity with Fanon-I switch between the two terms. For lucid accounts of Husserl's phenomenological investigations into the precise nature of phantasy see Jansen (2010) and Carreño Cobos (2013). 20 This distinction, standard in the literature, interestingly does not exhaust the scope of Husserl's thinking on the imagination.…”
Section: "Br E a K I Ng W I T H T H I S I M Pr I Son M E N T Of M A N...mentioning
confidence: 99%