Phenomenology and Teleology: Hans Jonas's Philosophy of Life

Coyne, Lewis

doi:10.3197/096327117x14913285800670

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Certain philosophers and scientists (behaviourists, for instance) doubt that humans act teleologically in a way that is irreducible to mechanistic explanation, contravening the idea that we could create beings according to purposeful designs. I follow Jonas in rejecting this view for phenomenological reasons[11], but of course concede that those who do not share this perspective will find my account of transcendent and immanent teleology suspect-thus undermining the general acceptability of the arguments set out here. Such is the nature of philosophically swimming against the stream 4.…”

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confidence: 90%

“…Although these terms have been defined in a multitude of ways, I take them to mean the following, based on a threefold distinction offered by Holmes Rolston III. 11 Instrumental value refers to something's capacity to act as a means to an end posited by the valuer. This is logically distinct from extrinsic value, which we find in something without reference to instrumental needs.…”

Section: The Axiological Dimension Of Teleologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The specific question of whether synthetic organisms can value extrinsically will be set aside, since this was defined as a non-instrumental valuing, which complicates matters somewhat. 13 The more elementary is surely instrumental valuing, the capacity for which, according to the terms we have adopted, is sufficient for an 11 John O'Neill [45], in particular, has provided a subtle analysis of the manifold senses of intrinsic value, but for the purposes of this article, the definitions given will suffice. The scope and meaning of the term 'intrinsic value' was a foundational debate in environmental ethics [46][47][48].…”

Section: The Axiological Dimension Of Teleologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ethics and Ontology of Synthetic Biology: a Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

Coyne

2019

Nanoethics

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This article is concerned with two interrelated questions: what, if anything, distinguishes synthetic from natural organisms, and to what extent, if any, creating the former is of moral significance. These are ontological and ethical questions, respectively. As the title indicates, I address both from a broadly neo-Aristotelian perspective, i.e. a teleological philosophy of life and virtue ethics. For brevity's sake, I shall not argue for either philosophical position at length, but instead hope to demonstrate their legitimacy through their explanatory power. I firstly argue that synthetic organisms differ in kind from natural organisms and machines, and differ only by degree from genetically modified organisms. I then suggest that this is nevertheless sufficient to give us specific ethical reservations about synthetic biology: namely, that more than any other widely used biotechnology, it is characterised by a drive to mastery that stands opposed to due appreciation of the giftedness of life. Keywords Synthetic biology. Virtue ethics. Aristotle. Teleology. Philosophy of technology. Hans Jonas The Bifurcation of Nature Synthetic biologists seek, broadly speaking, to create novel organisms using standardised biological parts and in accordance with engineering principles. The present analysis of synthetic biology will begin with the ontological question of what kind of beings synthetic organisms are, arriving at an answer by drawing comparisons with machines, natural organisms (henceforth 'organisms'), and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). First of all, therefore, we must define these entities, so as to clearly distinguish between them. To some this might seem unnecessary. In fact it is anything but: not only do biologists and philosophers of science frequently describe organisms in mechanistic terms for heuristic purposes (which we might excuse), but many also go further and suggest that organisms actually are a kind of machine [1]. This ontological claim is, I believe, wholly erroneous and serves to undermine ethical analysis concerning both human and non-human life. This misconception has a long and distinguished philosophical pedigree, however, stretching back at least as far as Descartes. Dividing the cosmos into res extensa and res cogitans, or 'extended' and 'intelligent' substances [2], Descartes' ontology promoted a theoretical 'bifurcation of nature' [3]. 1 The former substance, res

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confidence: 90%

Section: The Axiological Dimension Of Teleologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Axiological Dimension Of Teleologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ethics and Ontology of Synthetic Biology: a Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

Coyne

2019

Nanoethics

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“…One aspect of the problem is the tension between attribution of value on the basis of possessing human-like qualities and possessing value despite clearly being non-human like (see for example Coyne, 2017;Vetlesen, 2015). The value of interests is then a core concern.…”

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confidence: 99%

Environmentalism and Democracy in the Age of Nationalism and Corporate Capitalism

Spash¹

2017

Environmental Values

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Environmental commodification, trading and offsetting are business as usual approaches to environmental policy. There is also consensus across political divides about the need for economic growth. Many environmental NGOs have become apologists for corporate self-regulation, market mechanisms, carbon pricing/trading and biodiversity offsetting/banking, while themselves commercialising species 'protection' as eco-tourism. In this issue of Environmental Values the state and direction of the environmental movement are at the fore. D'Amato et al. contrast pragmatism with the need for revolutionary change and consider which will achieve social ecological transformation. Parry raises the issue of how animal activists should operate within an idealised deliberative democracy and what they could then legitimately justify doing to further their cause. Quist and Rinne are concerned with the challenges that disenfranchised groups face in building shared agendas and expressing themselves in their struggles to protect the environment and their ways of life. How natural resource extraction issues are framed by the media is the concern of Davies et al. Issues of power, inclusion and representation in the environmental movement are also raised in the paper by Fenney, which addresses the challenges specifically faced by disabled people. Societal change is an inherently value laden and political issue. Environmental policy is no more a win-win than any other policy; this journal issue shows how different polices change winners and losers.

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Environmental Ethics

Zagonari¹

2022

Environmental Ethics, Sustainability and Decisions

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Phenomenology and Teleology: Hans Jonas's Philosophy of Life

Cited by 8 publications

References 15 publications

The Ethics and Ontology of Synthetic Biology: a Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

The Ethics and Ontology of Synthetic Biology: a Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

Environmentalism and Democracy in the Age of Nationalism and Corporate Capitalism

Environmental Ethics

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