Phenomenology and Embodiment

Taipale, Joona

doi:10.2307/j.ctv4cbhkv

Cited by 56 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…My perception of the body of the other is special, however, because the relation of likeness is stronger with it than with all the other types of objects I might encounter—so strong as to be seen as an analogue of mine. In empathy, I see that our bodies are of “the same type” (Husserl, 1989, p. 172); the “same phenomenal type” (Husserl, 1973b, p. 4; as cited in Taipale, 2014, p. 82). This sense of analogy between our bodies primes a variety of other processes that constitute empathy.…”

Section: Empathymentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Some hyletic data present the contents of objects in the spatial world; they constitute “corresponding features of the thing ” (Husserl, 1989, p. 62); the blue of the ocean, the crescent of the moon. However, by itself, hyletic data “does not refer” to anything (Husserl, 1991, p. 94), but can be characterised as “proto-intentional” (Taipale, 2014, p. 28) “material for apprehensions” (Husserl, 1980, pp. 14, 103–104).…”

Section: Husserl’s Account Of Empathymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…49). “In this functional manner, kinaesthesis and hyletic sensations operate together and stand in a reciprocal dependency” (Taipale, 2014, p. 31). Kinaesthetic sensations are in fact an apperceptive moment of all sensory perceptions of the spatial world (Husserl, 1989, pp.…”

Section: Husserl’s Account Of Empathymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Husserl even suggests that kinaesthetic sensation might be functionally adaptable to expanding into incorporating new objects, like a walking cane. In the first-person context, the kinaesthetic system is therefore prone to reemployment (Husserl, 1973c, p. 299; as cited in Taipale, 2014).…”

Section: Second Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The format that is doing the representing in this case is the very same schema of proprioceptive kinaesthetic sensations that carries the contents of the information I receive about my own body during regular perception (which, as I noted, always comes with kinaesthetic experience). Noninteroceptive or nonlocalised hyletic data (i.e., visual sensations of shapes and colours of spatial objects) and kinaesthetic sensations are always a “constitutive duet” (Taipale, 2014, p. 36), however, when I see the other, the kinaesthetic system not only tells me about my body but takes on a dual mirroring function within the duet which could be characterised as a type of simulation.…”

Section: Second Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Husserlian empathy and embodied simulation

Williams

2020

Theory & Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article, I show that Husserl’s account of empathy supports embodied simulation theory. Both Husserl and embodied simulation accounts of intersubjectivity face the difficulty of accounting for the relations of similarity and difference between self and other, but there is ample neurological data available to the simulationist to establish the relations of similarity and difference, and Husserlian concepts provide a useful interpretive framework for this data. I then respond to the criticism that the theory of embodied simulation involves imitation and is therefore indirect and nonperceptual. Yet, some extra process must distinguish perceptual intersubjectivity from nonsocial perception, and the most direct additional process possible is the interbodily resonances of the kinaesthetic system endorsed by both simulationists and Husserl. Husserl gives an account of kinaesthetic sensations amounting to a phenomenological description of embodied simulation. This article exemplifies phenomenological correlationism whereby cognitive science and phenomenology serve to enlighten one another.

show abstract

Section: Empathymentioning

confidence: 97%