Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the ‘alien’ in alien control?

Pacherie, Élisabeth; Green, Melissa; Bayne, Tim

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.008

Cited by 84 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…In light of this, pathologies of agentive self-awareness in which the agent denies that one of their actions is their own are likely to be grounded in pathologies of agentive experience. The aetiological account of such pathologies would, on this approach, be primarily a matter of accounting for disturbances in the agent's experience of their own agency (Pacherie et al 2006).…”

Section: From Agentive Experiences To Agentive Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness

Bayne

Pacherie

2007

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This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a highlevel, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.

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Section: From Agentive Experiences To Agentive Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness

Bayne

Pacherie

2007

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“…But without one of these, there does not seem to be anything to generate a predictive model of the expected consequences of thinking θ (cf. Gallagher, ; Pacherie et al ., ; Vosgerau and Voss, ). One might try to respond to this concern by claiming that the predictions of cognitive actions are generated at a sub‐personal level (cf.…”

Section: Prediction Error Theorymentioning

confidence: 97%

Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion

Parrott

2017

Mind & Language

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This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a 'sense of agency', found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of an experience of thought insertion consists of two distinct elements: a state of ordinary first-person awareness and a sense that this state of awareness is highly unusual. In addition to modeling the experience of thought insertion, I also explain how a delusional pattern of thinking could lead someone who has this kind of experience to adopt a belief that some other entity is inserting thoughts into her mind. Finally, I briefly sketch a neurocomputational framework that could be developed to explain the sense that one's state of first-person awareness is highly irregular.Previous versions of this essay have been presented at Berkeley, King's College London, the University of Fribourg, the University of Manchester, and the University of Oxford. On all of these occasions, I was fortunate to receive extremely useful feedback and comments, for which I am very grateful. I would also like to thank

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“…En d'autres termes, les patients rapporteraient simplement ce qu'ils perçoivent ou ressentent [62,70]. Dans la schizophrénie, selon une telle perspective, une ACIE serait la contrepartie subjective d'une activité anormale des réseaux de neurones impliqués dans le contrôle des actions intentionnelles.…”

Section: Formation Et Maintien Du De´lire De Controˆle Par Des Forcesunclassified

Rôle du sens de l’effort dans le syndrome d’influence

Lafargue¹,

Franck

2008

Psychiatr Sci Hum Neurosci

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Dans le présent article, après avoir présenté les mécanismes neurocognitifs impliqués dans la production et la perception de l'effort moteur, nous nous interrogeons sur leur rôle possible dans l'agentivité, le processus cognitif par lequel un individu sait que c'est bien lui qui agit lorsqu'il agit. Nous suggérons qu'un agent se reconnaît comme l'initiateur de ses propres actes, avant tout, dans la mesure où il est capable d'appréhender consciemment l'effort qu'il fournit lorsqu'il agit. Nous présentons également des données expérimentales qui suggèrent que les patients schizophrènes ont une expérience consciente anormale de l'effort volontaire, combinée avec d'autres anomalies de la conscience des actes intentionnels, tout particulière-ment ceux qui sont parfois amenés à croire fermement que certains de leurs actes ou pensées sont initiés par des forces étrangères à eux. Les données que nous exposons soutiennent les théories selon lesquelles les croyances délirantes sont une conséquence directe d'expériences perceptives conscientes anormales.

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Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the ‘alien’ in alien control?

Cited by 84 publications

References 48 publications

Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness

Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness

Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion

Rôle du sens de l’effort dans le syndrome d’influence

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