Phenomenological experience of mental time travel with a counterpart self

Abstract

We investigated whether the phenomenological experience of mental time travel is similar when one travels as oneself versus with another possible self. Participants first described and rated their phenomenological experience for an autobiographical memory, a counterfactual event, and a future event (real‐self condition). Then, they imagined themselves as another person (a detective or a diver), described and phenomenologically rated a past event and a future event (counterpart‐self condition). The results largely replicated prior results in the real‐self condition. Novel findings showed that whereas phenomenology of past events in the counterpart‐self condition was similar to the past events in the real‐self condition, future events demonstrated poorer phenomenology in the counterpart‐self condition. Phenomenological experience was enhanced if participants adapted better to the counterpart self and if they had self‐related thoughts about and interest in the counterpart self. The results are discussed with reference to the role of self in mental time travel.