Phenomenal Presence

Frey, Christopher

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0004

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…In a final, fourth, interpretation, the object's presence amounts to a feeling of presence as regards that object: an intentional object is present to someone iff it is felt by that someone to be present, to be out there. Frey (2013) adheres to this interpretation by saying that the object is phenomenally present.…”

Section: The Direct Way Of Cashing Out the Phenomenality Of Intention...mentioning

confidence: 93%

Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality

Voltolini

2019

Erkenn

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As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: (i) an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is directly determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; ii) a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by the above phenomenal character, or it is a sui generis phenomenal property, thereby giving its own contribution to the overall phenomenal character of that state. Yet neither way sounds ultimately satisfying. For the indirect way may work only under the assumption that intentionality is monadic. Since the direct way explicitly endorses this assumption, the indirect way must give pride of place to it. Yet the direct way seems to be unsuccessful, in any of its forms. Thus, the phenomenal intentionality research program ought to give way to another research program concerning intentionality. PreliminariesAs one knows from Brentano (1995 2 ) onwards, intentionality is the property primarily of mental states of being about somethingintentionality of reference, as Kim (1996)

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Section: The Direct Way Of Cashing Out the Phenomenality Of Intention...mentioning

confidence: 93%

Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality

Voltolini

2019

Erkenn

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“…The option I will consider is, instead, to focus on a more basic or minimal notion of intentionality that could potentially be accepted without committing one to the claim that experiences have accuracy conditions. The most basic conception of intentionality is in terms of directedness or aboutness: to have intentionality is to be of, about, or directed at some entity or entities (see, e.g., Crane, 2003;Farkas, 2013;Kriegel, 2013;Frey, 2013;Mendelovici, 2018). The basic notion is often enriched with the claims that an intentional state or event is about something other than itself, and that it always presents the entity it is about from a certain point of view or under a certain aspect.…”

Section: Naïve Realism and Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists

Martina¹

2022

Phenomenology &Amp; Mind

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In this paper, I outline a disjunctivist proposal for understanding the intentionality of perceptions and hallucinations within a naïve realist framework. For the case of genuine perceptual experience, naïve realists can endorse a version of the view that their intentionality is phenomenally-grounded: perceptual experiences have intentionality in virtue of being relations of conscious acquaintance to aspects of the mind-independent environment. By contrast, hallucinations have intentionality dependently or derivatively, in virtue of their indiscriminability from, or similarity with respect to, perceptual experiences. Within this proposal, naïve realists can allow that perceptions and hallucinations have a property in common – that of being intentionally directed at apparently mind-independent entities – whilst having wholly different metaphysical natures.

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“…We will look at this from two angles; first, a deductive one, and second, an abductive one. 13 2. The argument has three premises: T1D, T2D, and T3D.…”

Section: Veridicalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Theories of Transparency

Averill

Gottlieb

2019

Erkenn

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Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two facts, and bridges the gap between them. Our aim in this paper is threefold: to scrutinize Michael Tye's transparency theory (2002, 2009, 2014a), introduce a new transparency theory, and advance a meta-theoretical hypothesis about the interest and import of transparency theories in general.

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Phenomenal Presence

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality

Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality

Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists

Two Theories of Transparency

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