Phenomenal Blending and the Palette Problem

Abstract

I discuss the apparent discrepancy between the qualitative diversity of consciousness and the relative qualitative homogeneity of the brain's basic constituents, a discrepancy that has been raised as a problem for identity theorists by Maxwell and Lockwood (as one element of the 'grain problem'), and more recently as a problem for panpsychists (under the heading of 'the palette problem'). The challenge posed to panpsychists by this discrepancy is to make sense of how a relatively small 'palette' of basic qualities could give rise to the bewildering diversity of qualities we, and presumably other creatures, experience. I argue that panpsychists can meet this challenge, though it requires taking contentious stands on certain phenomenological questions, in particular on whether any familiar qualities are actual examples of 'phenomenal blending', and whether any other familiar qualities have a positive 'phenomenologically simple character'. Moreover, it requires accepting an eventual theory most elements of which are in a certain explicable sense unimaginable, though not for that reason inconceivable. Nevertheless, I conclude that there are no conclusive reasons to reject such a theory, and so philosophers whose prior commitments motivate them to adopt it can do so without major theoretical cost.

Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone

“…For example, it might seem that a reddish phenomenal character is a simple phenomenal character, but it is in fact complex. Roelofs (2014) considers such a view, suggesting that our apparently simple phenomenal characters might be blends of the "alien" phenomenal characters of microexperiences.…”

“…The problem is that it is not clear how fundamental experiences can come together to form experiences such as our own. This problem is the combination problem, and it has been discussed at length by Seager (1995), Goff (2006), Stoljar (2006), Basile (2010), Coleman (2012), Roelofs (2014), Chalmers (2016), Morch (2014), and others.…”

Rational Agency without Self-Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?

“…Of course, my conceptual arguments cannot in themselves establish that we actually are group agents, and the full defence of this possibility requires discussing several other issues – about the unity of consciousness, the privacy of experience and the structure of the brain – which I address in other work (Roelofs , , Forthcoming‐a, Forthcoming‐b). But showing the correlative possibilities of moderately selfless agents and seamless collective agency is one step towards a compositional view of our own agency.…”

The Selection Problem for Constitutive Panpsychism

“…For all others, the relation in question will involve some form of 'blending'. The best-developed account of blending comes from Roelofs [2014]. On Roelofs' proposal, blending occurs when multiple micro-conscious qualities are experienced together.…”