Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany

Brander, Sofia; Baur, Sandra; Krais, Roman; Ross, J. Ole; Orr, Aaron; Sayne, Ryan; Howard, Michael; Mayer, M.; Panisko, Mark E.; Hayes, James C.; Bollhöfer, Andreas

doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2022.107034

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In some locations like Schauinsland, Germany, there are frequent detection of civilian emissions that may naively appear as nuclear explosions [27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34]. Schauinsland (IMS station DEX33) has detection of civilian radioxenon emissions in 40% to 66% of measurements [35]. A 2005 comparison shows a stark difference between measurements taken in Ottawa, Canada, versus a Pacific Island location [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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In the nuclear explosion monitoring context, what is an anomaly?

Miley,

Eslinger,

Bowyer

et al. 2024

J Radioanal Nucl Chem

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In the early years of nuclear explosion monitoring, experts used downwind detections with meaningful ratios of radioactive species to identify an explosion. Today’s reality is sparse networks of radionuclide monitoring stations looking for weak signals. Analysts need to discriminate between industrial background radioactivity and nuclear explosion signals, even using the detection of one isotope. Aerosol and xenon measurements potentially related to nuclear tests in 2006 and 2013 announced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and from worldwide civilian background radioactivity are considered when defining radionuclide detection anomalies to objectively guide the use of limited analyst resources and reduce the possibility of not detecting nuclear explosions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The French system, [46] uses an 8 h collection time and may replace current systems with a 24 h collection time. The Xenon International system was developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE) [35,47,48]. The xenon international system uses a 6 h collection time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In the nuclear explosion monitoring context, what is an anomaly?

Miley,

Eslinger,

Bowyer

et al. 2024

J Radioanal Nucl Chem

Self Cite

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Characterising the Radionuclide Fingerprint of an Advanced Gas-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor

Goodwin,

Petts,

Milbrath

et al. 2024

Pure Appl. Geophys.

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Radionuclides are monitored in the atmosphere for the signatures of nuclear explosions, as part of the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Civil nuclear facilities, such as Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and Isotope Production Facilities (IPFs) are sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the atmosphere and these signatures are sometimes indistinguishable to those of a nuclear explosion. In order to improve the understanding of civil radionuclide-emitting facilities and their impact on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the CTBT, a group of scientists from the UK, US and Sweden are collaborating with EDF Energy UK to measure radionuclide emissions from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) nuclear power station. Emissions are being measured at the source, via a stack monitor and high-resolution gamma spectrometry measurements of filters and also at tens of kilometres away via three sensitive radioxenon atmospheric samplers. The timing, isotopic composition, activity magnitudes and other release parameters of interest are investigated, to improve the discrimination between a civil radionuclide release and an explosive nuclear test. This paper outlines the work of the Xenon and Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration, describes the equipment fielded and provides initial results from each measurement campaign.

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