Pesticides and the Patent Bargain

Timmermann, Cristian

doi:10.1007/s10806-014-9515-x

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Antibiotic effectiveness is a resource of rivalrous consumption and therefore the knowledge on the antibiotic nature of the active ingredient loses its social value as bacterial resistance develops. As a consequence, inventors take most benefits from temporary exclusivity while society gains knowledge of decreased or little social utility after the period of exclusivity elapses (Outterson 2005, Timmermann 2015.…”

Section: The Different Sub-rights Within Property Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property Claims on Antibiotic Effectiveness

Timmermann

2021

Public Health Ethics

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The scope and type of property rights recognized over the effectiveness of antibiotics have a direct effect on how those claiming ownership engage in the exploitation and stewardship of this scarce resource. We examine the different property claims and rights the four major interest groups are asserting on antibiotics: (i) the inventors, (ii) those demanding that the resource be treated like any other transferable commodity, (iii) those advocating usage restrictions based on good stewardship principles and (iv) those considering the resource as common heritage of humankind.

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Section: The Different Sub-rights Within Property Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property Claims on Antibiotic Effectiveness

Timmermann

2021

Public Health Ethics

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“…Another approach to retain public control over food production is to require that the benefits of the patent-protected product is also beneficial for the general public—who mainly takes the role of consumers in this context—and is not harmful for future generations. When considering that some patented traits, notably pest resistance and herbicide tolerance, may have significantly reduced value when the patent expires, the usual social utility justification of patents is less convincing (Timmermann 2015 ). This warrants that risk assessment is supplemented with a compulsory evaluation of non-safety issues, which subsequently would imply that the company applying for commercial release and use of its product must take these into account.…”

Section: The Cultural Basis For Non-safety Assessmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-safety Assessments of Genome-Edited Organisms: Should They be Included in Regulation?

Myskja

Myhr

2020

Sci Eng Ethics

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This article presents and evaluates arguments supporting that an approval procedure for genome-edited organisms for food or feed should include a broad assessment of societal, ethical and environmental concerns; so-called non-safety assessment. The core of analysis is the requirement of the Norwegian Gene Technology Act that the sustainability, ethical and societal impacts of a genetically modified organism should be assessed prior to regulatory approval of the novel products. The article gives an overview how this requirement has been implemented in the regulatory practice, demonstrating that such assessment is feasible and justified. Even in situations where genome-edited organisms are considered comparable to non-modified organisms in terms of risk, the technology may have—in addition to social benefits—negative impacts that warrant assessments of the kind required in the Act. The main reason is the disruptive character of the genome editing technologies due to their potential for novel, ground-breaking solutions in agriculture and aquaculture combined with the economic framework shaped by the patent system. Food is fundamental for a good life, biologically and culturally, which warrants stricter assessment procedures than what is required for other industries, at least in countries like Norway with a strong tradition for national control over agricultural markets and breeding programs.

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“…RYAN [2002, p.35] is quoting HICKS (1994), who probably in the simplest way defines generic pesticide "as one 1 The patent protection is valid 20 years for the revealed molecule and after that period "the invention is free to be exploited by the public" [Timmermann 2015].. In the EU the Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) was introduced that "in effect extends the period of protection initially conferred by a patent to compensate for some of the patent life lost while obtaining marketing approval" [Hartnell 1996, p. 391].…”

Section: Arkadiusz Stajszczak 1* -Edward Majewskimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first year of the analysis is a season, in which the first generic product, of each pesticides was offered. Table 7 shows changes in prices and relations between values of the original (R&D) and generic equivalents of Tebuconazol 250 EW's in the period 2003-2015 In that period the number of generic producers has increased from one to eight. The value of sales of the branded pesticide has significantly decreased for the advantage of the generic.…”

Section: Influence Of Generics On Prices Of Pesticides With the Use Omentioning

confidence: 99%