“…The concern is that the emission reductions would have happened "anyway" and attributing them to the CDM is unjustified. While additionality is a crucial issue, most research on the topic has relied on unreliable information contained in official CDM project documents (Alexeew et al, 2010;Ganapati & Liu, 2008;He, Huang, & Tarp, 2014;Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007;Platonova-Oquab et al, 2012;Schneider, 2007Schneider, , 2011Wen & Yong, 2010). But these documents are written by project developers themselves and prone to significant information asymmetries (Wara, 2008(Wara, , p. 1799.…”
“…The concern is that the emission reductions would have happened "anyway" and attributing them to the CDM is unjustified. While additionality is a crucial issue, most research on the topic has relied on unreliable information contained in official CDM project documents (Alexeew et al, 2010;Ganapati & Liu, 2008;He, Huang, & Tarp, 2014;Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007;Platonova-Oquab et al, 2012;Schneider, 2007Schneider, , 2011Wen & Yong, 2010). But these documents are written by project developers themselves and prone to significant information asymmetries (Wara, 2008(Wara, , p. 1799.…”
“…HFC-23 can be abated through process optimization combined with thermal oxidation of the gas through incineration. The HFC-23/HCFC-22 ratio is typically in the range between 1.5 and 4 % (Schneider, 2011), depending on how the process is operated and the degree of process optimization that has been performed (McCulloch and Lindley, 2007), but can technically be reduced below 1 % (IPCC/TEAP, 2005). The removal efficiency of incineration of HFC-23 is taken to be virtually complete (99.99 %) (World Bank, 2010).…”
Section: Maximum Technically Feasible Reduction Scenariomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on this data, global baseline emission estimates are most affected by uncertainty in estimates in stationary air conditioning followed by commercial refrigeration and mobile air conditioning. To reduce uncertainty in emission estimates, it would be of particular interest to obtain measurement data on sectoral emission rates of refrigerants in various world regions, to complement currently available information from Europe and North America Schwarz, 2005;MPCA, 2012;UNFCCC, 2012). Equally important would be to improve access to measurement data which can verify reported figures, e.g., HFC-23 emissions in HCFC-22 production for major HCFC-22 producing countries.…”
Abstract. This study uses the GAINS model framework to estimate current and future emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases), their abatement potentials, and costs for twenty source sectors and 162 countries and regions, which are aggregated to produce global estimates. Global F-gas (HFCs, PFCs, and SF 6 ) emissions are estimated at 0.7 Pg CO 2 eq. in 2005 with an expected increase to 3.7 Pg CO 2 eq. in 2050 if application of control technology remains at the current level. There are extensive opportunities to reduce emissions using existing technology and alternative substances with low global warming potential. Estimates show that it would be technically feasible to reduce cumulative F-gas emissions from 81 to 11 Pg CO 2 eq. between 2018 and 2050. A reduction in cumulative emissions to 23 Pg CO 2 eq. is estimated to be possible at a marginal abatement cost below 10 EUR t −1 CO 2 eq. We also find that future F-gas abatement is expected to become relatively more costly for developing than developed countries due to differences in the sector contribution to emissions and abatement potentials.
“…Under the CDM, safeguards to prevent perverse incentives were gradually introduced and strengthened over time, following observations that the initial safeguards may not have been adequate 13,14,18 . Whereas the CDM requires using internationally agreed standards and international approval for registering projects and issuing credits, JI allows using a project-specific approach for calculating emission reductions, and either the host countries or the international Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC) execute regulatory oversight.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For such projects, revenues from credits can significantly exceed GHG abatement costs and, in some instances, the costs of producing the main product 10,11 . This can create perverse incentives for plant operators to increase production or waste generation beyond levels that would occur in the absence of crediting [12][13][14]17 . If more waste gas is generated owing to the incentives from crediting, emission reductions are overestimated; the emissions baseline is inflated compared to the emissions that would actually occur without crediting, and, in consequence, excess credits are issued.…”
Carbon markets are considered a key policy tool to achieve cost-e ective climate mitigation 1,2 . Project-based carbon market mechanisms allow private sector entities to earn tradable emissions reduction credits from mitigation projects. The environmental integrity of project-based mechanisms has been subject to controversial debate and extensive research 1,3-9 , in particular for projects abating industrial waste gases with a high global warming potential (GWP). For such projects, revenues from credits can significantly exceed abatement costs, creating perverse incentives to increase production or generation of waste gases as a means to increase credit revenues from waste gas abatement 10-14 . Here we show that all projects abating HFC-23 and SF 6 under the Kyoto Protocol's Joint Implementation mechanism in Russia increased waste gas generation to unprecedented levels once they could generate credits from producing more waste gas. Our results suggest that perverse incentives can substantially undermine the environmental integrity of project-based mechanisms and that adequate regulatory oversight is crucial. Our findings are critical for mechanisms in both national jurisdictions and under international agreements.The Kyoto Protocol's project-based mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for emission reductions projects in developing countries and Joint Implementation (JI) for projects in industrialized countries, provided industrialized countries flexibility in meeting their greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction commitments. Numerous sub-national and national jurisdictions are implementing similar mechanisms around the world, often in combination with emissions trading schemes 2 .Projects abating waste gases with a high global warming potential (GWP) can generate large volumes of emission reductions at low abatement costs 1,15 . Under the CDM, the two largest waste gas project types-incineration of hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) from hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22) production and destruction of nitrous oxide (N 2 O) from adipic acid productionaccount for only 0.3% of the registered projects but generated about half of the 1.5 billion emission reduction credits issued so far 16 . For such projects, revenues from credits can significantly exceed GHG abatement costs and, in some instances, the costs of producing the main product 10,11 . This can create perverse incentives for plant operators to increase production or waste generation beyond levels that would occur in the absence of crediting [12][13][14]17 . If more waste gas is generated owing to the incentives from crediting, emission reductions are overestimated; the emissions baseline is inflated compared to the emissions that would actually occur without crediting, and, in consequence, excess credits are issued.Such perverse incentives can be avoided through appropriate safeguards in methodological standards for the calculation of emission reductions, mainly by capping the amount of production and waste generation to historically observed levels or conse...
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