Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato'sLaws

Abstract

One of the distinctions that Plato in the Laws stresses most heavily in his discussion of the proper relation between the individual citizen and the laws of the city is that between persuasion and compulsion. Law, Plato believes, should try to persuade rather than compel the citizens. Near the end of the fourth book of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger, Plato's spokesman in this dialogue, asks whether the lawgiver for their new city of Magnesia should in making laws ‘explain straightaway what must and must not be done, add the threat of a penalty, and turn to another law, without adding a single bit of encouragement or persuasion [παραμυθας δ κα πειθος … ἓν] to his legislative edicts’ (Laws 720a 1–2). A few lines later, the Athenian Stranger himself condemns such a procedure as ‘the worse and more savage alternative’ (τò χεῖρον τοῖν δυοῖν κα γριώτερον 720e4). The better method is for the laws themselves to try to persuade (πεθειν) the citizens to act in the manner that they prescribe. And as a means of doing this, Plato proposes attaching preludes (προομια) to particular laws and to the legal code as a whole: such preludes will supplement the sanctions attached to the laws and will aim at persuading the citizens to act in the way that the laws direct for reasons other than fear of the penalties attached to the law. Such a practice, Plato believes, is an innovation: it is something that no lawgiver has ever thought of doing before (722b–e). And we have no reason to think that Plato is here excluding his earlier self, e.g. the Plato of the Republic and the Politicus, from this criticism.

Environmental Education And Metaethics

“…The preludes are to be written even though they may delve into abstruse metaphysics (as is the case for the long theological prelude of Laws 10) and, as the Stranger recognizes, most of the citizenry will be unable to fully understand the reasoning they present (722b). On this, see Bobonich 1999. 9.…”

Justice in theLaws, a Restatement: Why Plato Endorses Public Reason

“…An exegetical point: There is a debate in the literature on the Laws about whether the preambles are meant to be rational arguments or nonrational exhortations to obedience. Bobonich (1991: 366) and Schofield (2006: 319) argue the former, while others, including Popper (1945: 230), Laks (2000: 289), and Annas (2010: 75–76) argue the latter. It is beyond the scope of this essay to contribute to this interpretive debate.…”

“…So the reader should be aware that my argument is contingent on Bobonich's view being correct. Specifically, Bobonich (1991: 369) argues that ‘when Plato in the Laws insists that the laws try to persuade the citizens what he has in mind is rational persuasion: the citizens are to be given good epistemic reasons for the true beliefs that they are to adopt and for the course of action they are to follow’.…”

A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence

“…If this is correct, then there would be a big difference between the Laws and the Republic where only the philosophers have a rational grasp of right and wrong and where the other classes simply obey (Hall 1981, 93-6;Bobonich 1992;criticized by Stalley 1994). If this is correct, then there would be a big difference between the Laws and the Republic where only the philosophers have a rational grasp of right and wrong and where the other classes simply obey (Hall 1981, 93-6;Bobonich 1992;criticized by Stalley 1994).…”