Persuading the Principal to Wait

Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets

“…At the same time, this paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on information design in dynamic settings (e.g., Ely (2017); Che and Hörner (2018); Smolin (2017); Orlov, Skrzypacz, and Zryumov (2018)). 3 In contrast to the existing studies, we investigate stationary information policies with heterogeneous and forward-looking audience.…”

Leaks, Sabotage, and Information Design

“…Our model features persuasion in a dynamic environment, with a privately informed receiver taking actions repeatedly over time subject to imperfect monitoring by the sender. A small set of recent papers, notably Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015), Ely (2017), Ely and Szydlowski (2018), Ball (2018), and Orlov, Skrzypacz, and Zryumov (2018), have studied models of dynamic persuasion without private receiver information. Another emerging strand of the literature has studied the effects of combining persuasion with a privately informed receiver.…”

“…See, for instance,Orlov, Skrzypacz, and Zryumov (2018) andDaley and Green (2018) for recent papers tackling these issues. Additionally, in our setting the principal is informed of the true state once the project begins.…”

Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship

“…Papers in dynamic disclosure include Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer [2011], Guttman [2010], Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz [2014], Orlov, Skrzypacz, and Zryumov [2016], and Gratton, Holden, and Kolotilin [2018]. All of them focus on the sender's (or senders') choice of timing of disclosure, while our main interest remains in the informational content of the message.…”