Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses

Torrengo, Giuliano

doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9928-9

Cited by 16 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…In other words, an A-theorist can vindicate the robust sense of passage involved in the common sense narrative about reality and embrace the denial of the frozen present scenario, only if she goes beyond mere tense realism and "enriches" tenses with an irreducibly dynamic trait. I have argued for such a claim (Torrengo 2017c), here let me notice that I am not the only one who thinks something along those lines. Philosophers as diverse as Kit Fine, Huw Price and David Lipman share the same worry.…”

Section: The Hyper-russellianmentioning

confidence: 94%

Hyper-Russellian Skepticism

Torrengo

2017

Metaphysica

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The hyper-Russellian skeptic is someone who thinks that only one of all your experiences was, is, and will ever be conscious. Which one? The very one you are having now. Before you were always a zombie, and you will be a zombie for ever after. In the present literature on the metaphysics of passage of time, there is disagreement on whether our feeling that time passes — the “dynamic flavor” of our ordinary experience — provides support to the A-theory, that is, the thesis that the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. Lately, several philosophers have argued against this idea. In this paper I want to push this line of reasoning further by exploiting the hyper-Russellian scenario against the A-theory of time.

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Section: The Hyper-russellianmentioning

confidence: 94%

Hyper-Russellian Skepticism

Torrengo

2017

Metaphysica

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“…For arguments in favour of the B-theoretic outlook see e.g. Oaklander and White 2007;Le Poidevin 2007Mellor 1998;Prosser , 2013Prosser , 2016Price 1996Price , 2011Rasmussen 2012;Mozersky 2001Mozersky , 2013Mozersky , 2015Torrengo 2014Torrengo , 2017aTorrengo , 2017bTorrengo , 2018. It is not my intention here to give justice to all extant theories within the A and B orientations.…”

Section: Real Time and The Concept Of Timementioning

confidence: 98%

“…See e.g. Mozersky 2013Mozersky , 2015Price 2011;Prosser , 2013Prosser , 2016Torrengo 2017aTorrengo , 2017bTorrengo , 2018Skow 2015;Deasy 2017;Tallant 2019, to name a few participants in this lively debate. discuss a variety of means languages employ for temporal reference and assess their significance as evidence for the reductionist account.…”

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confidence: 99%

Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

Jaszczolt

2020

Philosophia

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Investigation into the reality of time can be pursued within the ontological domain or it can also span human thought and natural language. I propose to approach time by correlating three domains of inquiry: metaphysical time (M), the human concept of time (E), and temporal reference in natural language (L), entertaining the possibility of what I call a 'horizontal reduction' (L > E > M) and 'vertical reduction'. I present a view of temporality L/E as epistemic modality, drawing on evidence from the L domain and its correlates in the E and M domains. On this view, the human concept of time is a complex, 'molecular' concept and can be broken down into primitive concepts that are modal in nature, featuring as degrees of epistemic commitment to representations of states of affairs. I present evidence from tensed and tenseless languages (endorsing the L > E path) and point out its compatibility with the view of real time as metaphysical modality (endorsing the E > M path). Keywords Metaphysical time. Real time. Human concept of time. Time in language. Temporal reference. Reductionism. Modal reduction. Default Semantics. Tenseless languages Abbreviations time M Real time/metaphysical time time E Human concept of time time L Time in language 1 The Questions 'Yes, I love life. Why?' 'But you've made up your mind to shoot yourself.' Philosophia

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“…Instead, a sense of "absolute" motion is required that avoids anything existing against which the motion must be performed. 4 See, among others, the recent account byTorrengo (2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

Present’s actualizing and future’s becoming possible

Friebe

2023

THEORIA

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The paper spells out the thesis that the crucial, substantial move of presentism should be to temporalize modality. The present is not simply actual, and the future not simply possible, but the present is becoming actual, and the present’s becoming actual is future’s becoming possible (and past’s becoming necessary). I will argue that by so temporalizing modality, as modes of becoming rather than of being, the presentists can make room for the future (and the past), can answer the triviality-objection raised against them, and can provide a specific account of presentist change.

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Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses

Cited by 16 publications

References 28 publications

Hyper-Russellian Skepticism

Hyper-Russellian Skepticism

Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

Present’s actualizing and future’s becoming possible

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