2012
DOI: 10.1037/a0026078
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Personnel selection as a signaling game.

Abstract: Personnel selection involves exchanges of information between job market actors (applicants and organizations). These actors do not have an incentive to exchange accurate information about their ability and commitment to the employment relationship unless it is to their advantage. This state of affairs explains numerous phenomena in personnel selection (e.g., faking). Signaling theory describes a mechanism by which parties with partly conflicting interests (and thus an incentive for deception) can nevertheless… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

8
271
0
1

Year Published

2015
2015
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 219 publications
(303 citation statements)
references
References 164 publications
8
271
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…Self-verification in the job search context can be considered through the lens of signaling theory (Bangerter et al, 2012). This theory stresses the importance of applicants sending good signals to interviewers in the job search process.…”
Section: Self-verification Striving As a Differentiator On The Job Mamentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Self-verification in the job search context can be considered through the lens of signaling theory (Bangerter et al, 2012). This theory stresses the importance of applicants sending good signals to interviewers in the job search process.…”
Section: Self-verification Striving As a Differentiator On The Job Mamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are high stakes involved, and most job candidates have little incentive to present themselves accurately unless they perceive it will make them seem like a better fit for the position (Bangerter, Roulin, & König, 2012). However, we propose that Andy's strong drive to self-verify-to present herself accurately so that others understand her as she understands herself (Swann, 1983;Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992)-allowed her to differentiate herself from her other highly-qualified competitors.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Signaling theory (Bangerter, Roulin, & König, 2012;Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011;Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014;Spence, 1973) helps to understand how organizations might influence their attractiveness among potential applicants and how these applicants in turn might interpret organizations' signals. So, although organizations can try to manage their employer attractiveness by signaling specific attributes, perceptions of their attractiveness as employers are based not only on the messages and signals they send but also on "inferences drawn by the applicants receiving those signals" (Celani & Singh, 2011, p. 228).…”
Section: Study Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, applicant reactions research might benefit from a greater integration of frameworks other than organizational justice, which predominates work in the area. For example, a signaling theory framework might suggest a different approach and attention to different features of the recruitment environment as signals attended to by applicants (see Bangerter, Roulin & Konig, 2012 for a good theoretical integration of signaling theory and employee selection). Greater attention to the cognitive processes underlying applicant processing of information, via the elaboration likelihood model or other frameworks, might yield better insights into what information applicants attend to and when they do so.…”
Section: Personnel Assessment and Decisionsmentioning
confidence: 99%