Personhood and Creation in an Age of Robots and Ai: Can We Say “You” to Artifacts?

Abstract

This article explores the extent to which the I‐You relation should be applied to domains other than the human and the divine focusing particularly on artifacts and technology. Drawing first on the work of Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin Heidegger, I contend that the I‐You tradition has maintained I‐You relations with objects are possible even when these same figures level strong critiques of the I‐It relation. I extend these discussions and argue that some kind of You‐speaking for artifacts is needed to combat rampant consumption and reduction of the world to pure utility. But, I equally suggest that there are limitations to applying the I‐You relation to artifacts precisely when doing so keeps us from having genuine relationships with other people as outlined by psychologist Sherry Turkle. Finally, I outline how this proposal impacts the doctrine of creation. In sum, it expands our intuitions of what is included in that doctrine creation.

The Virtuous Servant Owner—A Paradigm Whose Time has Come (Again)

“… 16 Burdett (2020 : 355), basing himself on Pattison, makes a similar point. All of these thinkers have been preceded, in a sense, by Buber (1970 : 175) who, upon confronting a Doric column in a Syracuse church, writes that he related to the “spiritual form there that had passed through the mind and hand of man and become incarnate.” A distinction worthy of note is as follows.…”

“…When a man says I, he means one or the other” ( Buber, 1970 : 54). Consequently, some, like Michael Burdett (2020) , have suggested that it would be appropriate for us to relate to a robot as a “Thou.” Others, like Elizabeth Green (2018) argue that a robot can never be a Thou, while still others, like Sherry Turkle (2011a : 85), explain that the “Thou” relationship simply emerges.…”

“… 12 Many make this argument, e.g., Breazeal (2002) , Duffy (2003) , Walker (2006) , Darling (2017) , and Burdett (2020) . …”

“… Coeckelbergh (2010b) : a robot is “quasi-alterity” to be treated as it appears to us. Burdett (2020) : a robot is “quasi-person” which demands “Thou” relations. Don Ihde (1990 : 100): a robot is “quasi-other” but remains lower than human or animal; see also Bergen and Verbeek (2020) .…”

Artificial Intelligence and Theology: Looking for a Positive—but Not Uncritical—reception

“…Several analyses focus on the issue of Imago Dei; it is applied both to how we can understand the human condition when confronted with developments in AI coming close to the human mind, and to what extent Imago Dei interprets our intelligent creations, or whether personhood and what is associated with it can be attributed to machines too. Some studies point to a necessary revision of our theological anthropological categories, after observing the contrast between us and the machines (Barbour 1999; Herzfeld 2002, 2007; Brittain 2020); or the complex issue conceiving alterity in our relationship with these intelligent systems (Chaudhary 2020; Burdett 2020; La Parra 2021). The impression is that many things change when we consider these new arrivals or fresh developments and applications in AI; their status appears as ambivalent, or less clear, mid‐way between the mechanic thing and the real person able to interact and even to reveal some intention.…”