Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention: new tests of the Beard thesis

Heckelman, Jac C.; Dougherty, Keith L.

doi:10.1007/s11698-009-0042-3

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Empirical studies of the convention typically focus on more narrow themes, such as testing different versions of the Beard thesis (Heckelman & Dougherty, 2007, 2010McGuire, 2003;McGuire & Ohsfeldt, 1984, 1986, evaluating coalition formation (Jillson, 1981(Jillson, , 2008Londregan, 1999;Pope & Treier, 2019), and creating spatial maps of delegate preferences based on the statements they made in debate (Dougherty, 2020;Heckelman & Dougherty, 2013;Pope & Treier, 2015, 2019.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

Dougherty,

Hitefield

2023

American Politics Research

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The success of any constitutional convention can depend on its provisions for power sharing. We test three claims about the effects of the Great Compromise, a power sharing agreement, on the Constitutional Convention of 1787. First, we find that the convention was not more likely to pass proposals to strengthen the national government after the compromise than before, contrary to claims made by historians. Two small states increased their support, but other states did not. Second, Southern states (and large states) were more likely to support weakening the national government after the compromise. Third, large states were more likely to support proposals to strengthen the power of the House relative to the Senate after the compromise, and small states were more likely to resist. However, the opposite was not true for strengthening the Senate. Our results suggest a new narrative about the effects of Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

Dougherty,

Hitefield

2023

American Politics Research

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“…Carnes (2012, 2013) examines class backgrounds of legislators and decision‐making, while Witko and Friedman (2008) argue that legislators with business backgrounds are more likely to have probusiness voting records. Heckelman and Dougherty (2010) find a link between the financial interests of US Constitutional Convention delegates and constitutional adoption.…”

Section: Legislator Preferences Personal Financial Interests and Ecmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Private Interests of Public Officials: Financial Regulation in the US Congress

Peterson

Grose

2020

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Legislators' private financial holdings affect policy decisions. Due to financial self‐interest, we theorize that legislators whose personal investment portfolios include equities from firms affected by proposed policies vote for legislation that benefits those firms. We also theorize that legislators with greater personal exposure to equity investments support policies that benefit equities markets generally. We create a novel data set of legislators' personal stock investments and examine major congressional actions since the 1990s on financial deregulation and market intervention. US House members who own stocks in firms who benefit from financial deregulation vote for deregulation. House members with greater exposure to financial and automotive stocks support the financial and auto bailouts, respectively. General exposure to equities markets is also associated with support for key legislation boosting markets. The normative implications are significant, as legislators' private interests influence decisions in the public sphere.

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State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?

Carlsen¹,

Heckelman

2015

Southern Economic Journal

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Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention followed the procedure of requiring state votes to be determined by the majority vote of each states present delegates, and the outcome of the vote to be decided by majority vote of the states. In establishing the new legislature, the adopted Constitution set rules such that a simple majority of all present representatives would determine the outcome of each legislative vote. We investigate how Convention vote outcomes might have changed if this voting rule was in place for the Convention. Using spatial models on 398 separate roll calls, we identify which vote outcomes would have differed under individual delegate voting. Analysis suggests only 16 of the vote outcomes would have changed but those that were predicted to change included considering unequal representation in the Senate (i.e., similar to representation in the House) and requiring two-thirds (rather than threefourths) of states to ratify constitutional amendments.

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Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention: new tests of the Beard thesis

Cited by 7 publications

References 17 publications

The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

The Private Interests of Public Officials: Financial Regulation in the US Congress

State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?

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