Mexico and Malaysia are contrasting countries, geographically on opposite sides of the globe, with plenty of cultural differences, but with a similar gross domestic product per capita, and a similar banking commercial system. The hypothesis is the the economic compensation systems of bank employees in both countries, salaries, bonus and merit based pay, correlate with the same labor commitment. The research uses the same data collection instrument and results recently obtained in a Malaysian study to compare them to the Mexican case, through multivariate analysis. First results show that the Malaysian instrument is consistently valid and reliable in the case of Mexico. Second, the study confirms that Mexico’s strategy of raising the salary of bankers, or their bonuses, or merit-based payments, may increase organizational commitment but not altogether. Third, results suggest that merit-based compensation schemes are more efficient in countries with low uncertainty aversion, such as Malaysia, and less efficient in countries with high risk aversion, as in the case of Mexico.