Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations

Abstract

Philosophical Studies, 158 (2012): 257-287. AbstractIn Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes a person-affecting account which meets Parfit's challenge. The account satisfies Parfits four requirements, and avoids many of the criticisms that have been raised against person-affecting views.

Population axiology

“…The theory developed in Meacham () avoids this third problem, via careful specification of the relevant counterpart relations relating persons in different states of affairs. Others (e.g., Temkin, , section 12.3; Ross, , p. 438) propose that a principle of harm‐minimisation forms only part of the correct overall axiology and that the problem of disjoint populations is to be dealt with by some other part of the overall theory.…”

“…Others suggest that one might escape from the impossibility theorems by denying the assumptions that those theorems make concerning the structure of the well‐being scale, and/or by appealing to vagueness or incompleteness of the betterness relation (Broome, , pp.213‐4; Qizilbash, ; Rabinowicz, ; Parfit, ; Thomas, n.d.). Still others argue that the normative force of the impossibility theorems depends on an assumption of choice‐set‐independence, and then go on argue that the choice‐set‐dependence exhibited by, for example, necessitarianism and comparative‐harm theories may be positively a virtue of those theories, so that we can hope to find an adequate theory in this space (see in particular Meacham, , section 7; related ideas are pressed by Temkin (, )).…”

“…Theories along these lines are discussed by Roberts (2003Roberts ( , 2011, Meacham (2012), Temkin (2012), and Ross (2015).…”

Possible Persons and the Problem of Prenatal Harm

“…With this in mind, it is suggested that on the psychological approach the best way to make sense of claims relating to trans-world identity and possible persons that does not collapse into a list containing all of the causal factors that lead to the development of one as opposed to another psychology and confirm that virtually all acts relating to possible persons are permitted, is to appeal to a different, non-essentialist, modal basis for determinations of identity across possible worlds where the criteria are slightly looser. Such a basis, it has been suggested (Wrigley 2006(Wrigley , 2012Meacham 2012), can be found in Lewis's modal realism (Lewis 1986) according to which trans-world identity is determined not by reference to essential properties or strict identity relations, but instead via counterpart relations, defined as objective similarity relations (Divers 2007, p. 42). This view, I suggest, fits best with the psychological approach as it allows us to separate identity within worlds from identity across worlds.…”

Essentialism and the Nonidentity Problem

“… One can interpret Meacham () as providing such a theory. Though as he says on p. 265, he intends his proposal to be interpretable either as a descriptive essentialist view, or as a version of the de dicto approach. …”