‘Perplexities of the rights of man’: Arendt on the aporias of human rights

Abstract

This article provides a new interpretation of Hannah Arendt's critical analysis of the 'perplexities of the Rights of Man' by drawing attention to its overlooked methodological orientations, especially its 'aporetic' nature. Arendt's critique is aporetic as it centres on the paradoxes of human rights and analyses them by putting into practice a mode of inquiry that she associates with Socrates. The article challenges the conventional understanding of aporia as a paralysing impasse and suggests that aporetic thinking can create possibilities of rethinking key concepts especially in times of crises. To make this point, I respond to Jacques Rancière's criticism that the paradoxes introduced by Arendt paralyse thinking and doom human rights to an inevitable destiny of failure. I argue that, precisely because of its aporetic nature, Arendt's critique attends to possibilities of rethinking and reinventing human rights, as can be seen in her articulation of 'a right to have rights'.

Re-envisioning Human Rights in the Light of Arendt and Rancière: Towards an Agonistic Account of Human Rights Education

“…This article takes up Arendt's ‘aporetic’ framing of human rights (Gündoğdu, ) as well as Rancière's critique and suggests that reading them together may offer a way to re‐envision human rights and HRE—not only because they make visible the perplexities of human rights, but also in that they call for an agonistic understanding of rights; namely, the possibility of making new and plural political and ethical claims about human rights as practices that can be evaluated critically rather than taken on faith (Hoover, ). In particular, this article complements the work of writers such as Schaap (), Keet () and Hoover (), in considering the implications of an agonistic account inspired by Arendt and Rancière's engagement with human rights, especially in terms of how such an account makes possible openings for critical and transformative manifestations of HRE.…”

“…Arendt's critical analysis of human rights has provoked interesting scholarly debates over the years. While some scholars have turned to her critique to grapple with the challenging problems posed by the continuing plight of non‐citizens to the existing normative frameworks of human rights, others have utilised her approach to rethink politics of human rights in relation to practices of claiming rights (Gündoğdu, ). However, there have also been several criticisms of Arendt's political and ontological framing of human rights (e.g.…”

Hannah Arendt and Global Justice

“…As Owens nicely puts it, “her approach to political thinking remains a source for those in search of guidance not in what to think but how to think about politics and war today” (Owens , 7, italics added). Gündogdu () refers to this methodology as aporetic – raising a puzzle about a common political concept and showing the inherent tensions within it. Gündogdu argues that for Arendt, this aporetic thinking does not leave us puzzled and paralyzed (as Rancière () claims), but liberates our judgment and allows us to think through the impasses inherent in traditional concepts.…”

“…Gündogdu () proposes a novel reading of Arendt, one that helps lessen the force of Benhabib's criticism. She argues that we ought to attend to the aporetic nature of Arendt's writings, especially when it comes to human rights.…”

“…This kind of thinking is necessary in order to ultimately be able to think human rights beyond conventional binaries, such as man/citizen, universal/particular, and nature/history. By attending to their multiple, equivocal and contingent meanings, Arendt shows us how “the paradoxes of human rights can be politically navigated to contest inequality” (Gündogdu , 6). When Arendt's thinking is read as an aporetic inquiry, the lack of foundations is not a problem awaiting a solution; rather, “Arendt's critique attends to the possibilities of rethinking and reinventing human rights” (Gündogdu , 4).…”