2013
DOI: 10.1007/s10982-013-9175-4
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Permissive Laws and the Dynamism of Kantian Justice

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Cited by 10 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Public right concerns the juridical relationship between a state and its own members (or between states) and involves “a permissive law ( lex permissiva ) of practical reason” (Kant [1797] 1996, 406; AK 6:246). This principle authorises the temporary delay of a necessary reorganisation of an unjust order when the “implementation of immediate reform would counteract the ruler’s duty to reform the legal order as a whole” (Weinrib 2013, 108). True politics draws on empirical knowledge and prudent judgement of the circumstances under which the existing legal system can be brought into conformity with its own standard of adequacy.
Since the severing of a bond of civil or cosmopolitan union even before a better constitution is ready to take its place is contrary to all political prudence, which agrees with morals in this, it would indeed be absurd to require that those defects be altered at once and violently; but it can be required of the one in power that he at least take to heart the maxim that such an alteration is necessary, in order to keep constantly approaching the end (of the best constitution in accordance with laws of right).
…”
Section: The Indirect Legitimation Theoremmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Public right concerns the juridical relationship between a state and its own members (or between states) and involves “a permissive law ( lex permissiva ) of practical reason” (Kant [1797] 1996, 406; AK 6:246). This principle authorises the temporary delay of a necessary reorganisation of an unjust order when the “implementation of immediate reform would counteract the ruler’s duty to reform the legal order as a whole” (Weinrib 2013, 108). True politics draws on empirical knowledge and prudent judgement of the circumstances under which the existing legal system can be brought into conformity with its own standard of adequacy.
Since the severing of a bond of civil or cosmopolitan union even before a better constitution is ready to take its place is contrary to all political prudence, which agrees with morals in this, it would indeed be absurd to require that those defects be altered at once and violently; but it can be required of the one in power that he at least take to heart the maxim that such an alteration is necessary, in order to keep constantly approaching the end (of the best constitution in accordance with laws of right).
…”
Section: The Indirect Legitimation Theoremmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of interpreters, particularly those who are happy to bracket Kant’s wider philosophical commitments, have thus mistakenly ascribed to him the notion of freedom as self‐directed action. According to what might be described as an emerging interpretive orthodoxy, agents are externally free to the extent that they “determine their own purposes” (Weinrib , 115) and “get to decide for themselves” (Hodgson , 808). Freedom, that is to say, is the “ability to direct your movements without constraint by others” (Ebels‐Duggan , 897; see also Stilz , 38).…”
Section: Freedom and The Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%