Permission or Prohibition of Vertical Integration: the Experience of the Russian Freight Rail and Power Industry

Abstract

Despite the presence of a positive effect from the development of competition, confirmed both in theory and in practice, in a crisis, priorities can be given to short-term effects of the financial stability of a business. The authors analyzed the state of the industries of electricity generation and freight rail transportation in terms of their vertical integration model and financial results of companies, including an assessment of the cost of the latter's business. The choice of industries is justified by the absence of vertically integrated companies in the first industry and their presence in the second, which allows us to analyze the causes and consequences of allowing vertical integration for companies in backbone industries. The results of the analysis of financial multipliers show that in the case of vertical integration of railway companies with an infrastructure organization, there is no “premium” to the value of the business relative to non-integrated companies. This leads to the conclusion that integrated companies in the industry do not receive unconditional advantages over nonintegrated players. At the same time, vertical integration and competition are not connected by an unambiguous causal relationship, however, the experience of the studied industries demonstrates that vertical integration may not hinder the development of competition in the industry. We assume that a further increase in the level of competition in the electricity market can be ensured by separating assets in the formed wholesale market, even if the ban on vertical integration is lifted.