Permissible Promise-Making Under Uncertainty

Abstract

I outline four conditions on permissible promise-making: the promise must be for a morally permissible end, must not be deceptive, must be in good faith, and must involve a realistic assessment of oneself. I then address whether promises that you are uncertain you can keep can meet these four criteria, with a focus on campaign promises as an illustrative example. I argue that uncertain promises can meet the first two criteria, but that whether they can meet the second two depends on the source of the promisor's uncertainty. External uncertainty stemming from outside factors is unproblematic, but internal uncertainty stemming from the promisor's doubts about her own strength leads to promises that are in bad faith or unrealistic. I conclude that campaign promises are often subject to internal uncertainty and are therefore morally impermissible to make, all else being equal.

Overbooking: Permissible when and only when scaled up

“…When is one permitted to promise under uncertainty? Alida Liberman (2019) lays out three conditions. First, the performance must itself be permissible.…”

On the Rationality of Vow‐making

“…While my present focus is on rational commitments, similar concerns arise regarding promises, which involve a non‐waivable commitment to morally bind yourself to another person to act in a certain way in the future (so long as they want you to do so). See Liberman (forthcoming) for an account of when it is morally permissible to make promises that you are uncertain you will keep in the future.…”