Perils of pluralism: Electoral violence and incumbency in sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract

Why do some multiparty elections lead to political violence while others do not? Despite extensive literatures on democratization, civil war, and violence against civilians in civil war, the topic of electoral violence has received less attention. We develop a set of theoretical propositions to explain this variation, testing them on an original dataset on African elections from 1990 to 2008. We find that elections in which an incumbent presidential candidate is running for re-election are significantly more likely to experience electoral violence, both prior to the election and after voting has taken place. We argue that clientelism is behind this pattern, and that clients often resort to electoral violence to protect a reliable incumbent patron. On the other hand, when an incumbent candidate is not running for office, we argue that clients are less willing to assume the risks of participating in electoral violence because candidates in the election have not established a record of delivering patronage at the executive level. We further find some evidence that pre-existing social conflicts increase the risk of pre-election violence. We suggest that this finding is due to the tendency of political elites to mobilize voters around pre-existing political and economic grievances to promote their candidacies, in turn heightening tensions and divisions. We also examine, but find little support for, a number of other possible determinants of electoral violence, such as regime type, income level, international observers, ongoing civil war, pathway to power, and first elections after civil war. The article contributes not only to a small but growing literature on electoral violence but also to a burgeoning literature on political behavior in African elections.

Do Contentious Elections Trigger Violence?

“…Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2013) find that when institutionally unconstrained incumbents have information suggesting that they will lose the election, they become more likely to engage in pre-electoral violence. Finally, Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus (2013) find that most violence takes place before elections and is committed by incumbents seeking re-election in Sub-Saharan Africa. They also demonstrate that pre-existing social conflict and the quality of founding elections shape pre-vote violence, while the stability of democratic institutions and weaker economic growth shape postvote violence.…”

Sustainable Peace Building and Development in Nigeria’s Post-Amnesty Programme: The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in Oil Host Communities

“…As a result, we hypothesize that MOC's CSR has not made significant impact on entrepreneurship development and creation of jobs to absorb the ex-militant that take part in the government sponsored skill acquisition empowerment training for the post-amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This paper, in its positioning, departs from existing African amnesty programme literature, which has aimed at, inter alia: the search of sustainable peace in the Niger Delta through the amnesty programme (Oludoro & Oludoro, 2012); understanding justice and equity in the Niger Delta amnesty programme (Omokha, 2015); challenges and opportunities in amnesty to Niger Delta militants for future peace mission (Thom-Otuya & Eremie, 2011); challenges and prospects of post-amnesty programme in the Niger Delta (Oluwaniyi, 2011); amnesty programme as a peacebuilding initiative in Niger Delta, Nigeria (Tobor & Odubo, 2017); political economy of amnesty programme for sustainable peace and development of the Niger Delta (Udoh & Chijioke, 2017); the impact and challenges in post conflict in Niger Delta amnesty programme (Omokhoa & Ikelegbe, 2016); dissent and state excesses in the Niger Delta (Omotola, 2009); peril of pluralisms in electoral violence and incumbency in sub-Saharan Africa (Taylor et al, 2017);a silver bullet in the Nigeria's amnesty programme as a peacebuilding infrastructure (Ushie, 2013); timing and sequencing in peacebuilding of the Niger Delta amnesty programme (Ukiwo, 2016); oil and militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta region (Oluwaniyi, 2010); a qualitative review of the militancy, amnesty, and peacebuilding in Nigeria's Niger Delta (Udoh, 2013); causes and consequences of crude oil pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Umar & Othma, 2017); and Niger Delta militants with respect to the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (UNHCR, 2011).…”

O papel dos tribunais na redução da violência eleitoral na Nigéria

“…At the same time, both state actors and opposition groups can engage in electoral violence strategically to influence the turnout and outcome of elections, although state actors are much more likely to engage in electoral violence. Taylor et al (2017) estimate that upwards of 80 percent of electoral violence is perpetrated by the state.…”