Performance of community-based natural resource governance for the Kafue Flats (Zambia)

Abstract

SUMMARYThe performance obstacles surrounding community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) in southern Africa have much to do with understanding of environmental governance systems and how these are devolved. CBNRM appears to be failing because of flawed environmental governance systems compounded by their ineffective devolution. A case study in Zambia is used to illustrate why and how one CBNRM scheme for the most part faltered. It draws on practical experiences involving the devolution of decision-making and benefit-distribution processes on a floodplain wetland known as the Kafue Flats. While this CBNRM scheme was designed to facilitate the devolution of key components of an environmental governance system, the resultant efforts were largely unsuccessful because of the poor social relationships between government actors and local rural communities. It is argued that in Zambia, at least from an environmental governance system perspective, CBNRM has mostly failed. While generally bringing some marginal improvements to local communities, the construction and execution of an effective environmental governance system have been largely flawed.

A Typology of Benefit Sharing Arrangements for the Governance of Social-Ecological Systems in Developing Countries

“…Governance in the context of social-ecological systems refers to multilevel socio-political and economic processes that enable society to define and accept or reject alternative environmental agendas (Boyle et al 2001, Folke et al 2005, Hall 2006, Duit et al 2010, Nkhata and Breen 2010. These processes can be considered to provide the means of social http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss1/art17/ coordination that engender collective action (Ostrom 1990), ordered rule (Stoker 1998), and allow members of society to share power and make collective decisions at multiple levels (Imperial 2005).…”

“…As a form of benefit sharing arrangements, collaborative initiatives are premised on the assumption that the human well-being of communities can be improved if and when communities are allowed to participate in natural resource management. These initiatives are usually driven by strong statutory mechanisms and can be viewed as the institutionalization of benefit sharing arrangements at local or community levels (Nkhata and Breen 2010). They mostly seek to devolve the authority and responsibilities for the governance of ecosystem services to rural communities, which are essentially not agents of the state.…”

Engaging common property theory: implications for benefit sharing research in developing countries

“…This usually involves the delegation of government functions from the centre to the periphery in the process of allocating ecosystem services. One of the most common features of CBNRM approaches has been the establishment of revenue-sharing mechanisms (Nkhata and Breen 2010). Other examples of benefit sharing approaches that reflect elements of hierarchical arrangements include Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), Community Forest Management, Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), and Community-Based Wildlife Conservation (CBWC).…”

“…This is compounded by the unwillingness of actors operating at multiple political and spatial scales to learn how to learn together in addressing problems associated with the sharing of benefits from common-pool water resources. Examples of non-cooperation in benefit sharing schemes are well-documented (Brockhaus and Botoni 2009, Kosmus and Cordero 2009, Suneetha and Pisupati 2009, Nkhata and Breen 2010. In many respects, these problems can be defined as classic collective action problems, which are a purview of common property theory.…”

Delivering community benefits through REDD+: Lessons from Joint Forest Management in Zambia

“…Adger et al, 2001). If such benefits are to reach the community, clear rules (see Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003) must be in place and must be adhered to by all participants (Nkhata and Breen, 2010). In addition, the broader macro-scale context, including policy and legal frameworks, is important; such macro context shapes the benefits that are available for JFM to harness, and the opportunity costs that it must address (Reynolds, 2012).…”