Performance Metrics for Collaborative and Cross-Functional Teams

Hutchison‐Krupat, Jeremy; Kavadias, Stelios

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1604727

Cited by 7 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Prior research has established that conflicts among different firms or divisions within a firm are caused by their fundamentally different interests (Balasubramanian & Bhardwaj, ; Hutchison‐Krupat & Kavadias, ; Li & Atkins, ; Mihm, ; Narayanan & Raman, ; Siemsen, ). For example, a firm's manufacturing division incurs manufacturing costs and therefore primarily aims to minimize costs (Li & Atkins, ), whereas a firm's marketing division aims to maximize revenue (Natter, Mild, Feurstein, Dorffner, & Taudes, ; Balasubramanian & Bhardwaj, ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a general setting, Mihm () shows that by the revelation principle, an optimal Bayesian contract can be constructed between a principal (firm) and multiple agents (engineers) such that all engineer‐agents with private information will behave more in line with the firm's interests. Another mechanism is performance measurement (Hutchison‐Krupat & Kavadias, ; Mihm, ; Siemsen, ). This stream of literature primarily aims to tackle the challenge of managing agents’ nonverifiable efforts in complex organization by awarding (penalizing) individual employee actions that are aligned (misaligned) with a firm's overall task priority.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Mihm () shows the value of target costing in aligning design engineers’ individual objectives with the firm's objectives. Hutchison‐Krupat and Kavadias () studies the conditions in which offering performance‐based contracts is beneficial to organizations. Our study takes a different approach from that of previous studies set forth above.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, a stream of NPD literature has emerged to account for the hierarchical nature of organizational decision making (Chao & Kavadias, ; Hutchison‐Krupat & Kavadias, ; Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, ). These studies primarily consider the vertical distribution of decision power between the principal (firm) and its agent (the division).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many critical business decisions are currently made by cross‐functional teams composed of representatives from multiple functionalities or departments (Griffin, ; Hutchison‐Krupat & Kavadias, ; Mihm, ). In the context of new product development (NPD), for example, firms rely on cross‐functional teams for product development between 70% and 75% of the time (McDonough, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Decision Making in Cross‐Functional Teams: The Role of Decision Power*

Cui

2015

Decision Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Through a series of game-theoretical models, this study systematically examines decision making in cross-functional teams. It provides a framework for the design of an organization-specific decision-making process and for the alignment of a team's microdecision with the "optimal" decision that maximizes the firm's payoff. This study finds that even without changing the team leader, firms could change and even dictate the team's microdecision outcome via adjusting the team member's seniority, empowering team members with veto power or involving a supervisor as a threat to overrule the team decision. This finding implies that to reposition products in the marketplace, structuring cross-functional teams' microdecision-making processes is essential. Subject Areas: cross-functional team, decision-making process, decision power, game theory, and stakeholder management.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Decision Making in Cross‐Functional Teams: The Role of Decision Power*

Cui

2015

Decision Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Democratic versus elite governance for project selection decisions in executive committees

Manouchehrabadi

Letizia

Hendrikse

2022

European Journal of Operational Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Opt‐Out Options in New Product Co‐development Partnerships

Savva

Scholtes

2014

Production and Operations Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

W e study three contractual arrangements-co-development, licensing, and co-development with opt-out options-for the joint development of new products between a small and financially constrained innovator firm and a large technology company, as in the case of a biotech innovator and a major pharma company. We formulate our arguments in the context of a two-stage model, characterized by technical risk and stochastically changing cost and revenue projections. The model captures the main disadvantages of traditional co-development and licensing arrangements: in co-development the small firm runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone and royalty (M&R) payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency, as profitable projects might be abandoned. Counter to intuition we show that the biotech's payoff in a licensing contract is not monotonically increasing in the M&R terms. We also show that an option clause in a co-development contract that gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of co-development and into a pre-agreed licensing arrangement avoids the problems associated with fully committed co-development or licensing: the probability that the small firm will run out of capital is greatly reduced or completely eliminated and profitable projects are never abandoned.

show abstract

Performance Metrics for Collaborative and Cross-Functional Teams

Cited by 7 publications

References 26 publications

Decision Making in Cross‐Functional Teams: The Role of Decision Power*

Decision Making in Cross‐Functional Teams: The Role of Decision Power*

Democratic versus elite governance for project selection decisions in executive committees

Opt‐Out Options in New Product Co‐development Partnerships

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About