2015
DOI: 10.1177/0020852314554541
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Performance management in the local public sector in France: an administrative rather than a political model

Abstract: The purpose of this research is to analyse and characterise the practices of French local authorities in the field of performance management. It sets out to do so, as a first step, by putting forward a theoretical analytical framework of the different models of local performance management. It then goes on to draw on this framework and test it empirically in order to understand the nature of the French model of local performance management. The results of our research demonstrate the existence of a French, "pe… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…The 2009 Health Care Act reinforced the role of the hospital director at the expense of hospital board members; the former is appointed by the central government rather than elected by their peers. As Favoreu et al (2015) suggest, French reforms are organized around performance management as a system of rules, novel accounting mechanisms to provide fair compensation to care providers (hence, the extensive use of DRGs, with the penetration rate of 100 percent which is the highest in Europe), performance evaluation and central steering methods (e.g., regional and national expenditure targets, pay-for-performance contracts for care providers; government-set fees for medical procedures, management by objective) rather than around entrepreneurship, competition, and marketization, all of which produced very modest returns (Moran, 2016).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The 2009 Health Care Act reinforced the role of the hospital director at the expense of hospital board members; the former is appointed by the central government rather than elected by their peers. As Favoreu et al (2015) suggest, French reforms are organized around performance management as a system of rules, novel accounting mechanisms to provide fair compensation to care providers (hence, the extensive use of DRGs, with the penetration rate of 100 percent which is the highest in Europe), performance evaluation and central steering methods (e.g., regional and national expenditure targets, pay-for-performance contracts for care providers; government-set fees for medical procedures, management by objective) rather than around entrepreneurship, competition, and marketization, all of which produced very modest returns (Moran, 2016).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A conflict exists between short-term quantitative targets and qualitative targets (Verbeeten, 2008). Despite recent advances, the institutional traditions and bureaucratic legacy contribute to the maintenance of hierarchical and legalistic structures, not with standing the international diffusion of the NPM doctrine (Favoreu, et al, 2015), which suggests a further discussion of indicators (Jääskeläinen, & Laihonen, 2014) and the need for systems to effectively manage public services (Arnaboldi, et al, 2015).…”
Section: Public Sector Performance Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reducing red tape is also among the highlighted benefits (Oh and Lee, 2020). The use, non-use, advantages and limitations of evaluation are discussed in the context of bureaucracies and political authorities (Kudo, 2003), local governments (Favoreu et al, 2015) and national parliaments (Speer et al, 2015).…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%