Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China

Liang, Jiaqi; Langbein, Laura

doi:10.1080/10967494.2015.1043167

Cited by 142 publications

(97 citation statements)

References 119 publications

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“…According to empirical studies by Hu, Yan, and Liu () and Schreifels and others (), the MTS has remarkably strengthened the implementation capacity of China's local governments in the area of environmental protection. Research by Mei () and Liang and Langbein () reached the same conclusion as well. Nonetheless, the specific incentivizing mechanism at work under the MTS remains unclear.…”

Section: Mandatory Target System Policy Feedback and The Official Rsupporting

confidence: 66%

“…This article finds that the MTS has a significant influence on local governments' environmental policy implementation. Unlike previous research that focuses on the rewards and punishment system (Liang & Langbein, 2015;Mei, 2012), this article reveals the existence of another possible incentivizing mechanism under the MTS-the official ranking tournament. Negative feedback from performance rankings and competition brought by the MTS play a crucial role in motivating local governments to adjust their performance in environmental policy implementation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 54%

“…MTS provides highpowered incentives for government officials (Kostka, 2014;Liang, 2014;Liang & Langbein, 2015;Mei, 2012).…”

Section: Mandatory Target System Policy Feedback and The Official Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While previous researchers have generally reached a consensus that China's MTS has improved environmental policy implementation (Liang & Langbein, ; Mei, ; Schreifels, Fu, & Wilson, ), controversy exists over whether the rewards and punishment system from the central government has significant stimulating effects on local officials. For instance, empirical findings (X. Tang, Liu, & Yi, ) offer support for an alternative story.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite these debates on the dominant mechanism, scholars have agreed on the significance of incentive design in China's environmental governance (Chan, Wong, Cheung, & Lo, 1995;Kostka, 2014;Liang, 2014;Liang & Langbein, 2015;Swanson, Kuhn, & Xu, 2001). The mainstream view suggests that the central government and local governments are embedded in a principal-agent relationship, in which the central government is the principal who sets governance goals and the local governments are the agents who carry out these goals (Kostka & Mol, 2013).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Tang

Liu

2018

Review of Policy Research

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With the deterioration of the environment across the globe, environmental problems have attracted much attention from the public, academia, and governments. This study contributes to the understanding of environmental policy implementation by empirically testing the policy feedback theory and official ranking tournament theory in the Chinese context. In particular, it focuses on how prior environmental performance ranking transitions into future policy performance through the mandatory target system (MTS) in China. The results from this study show that provincial environmental performance ranking serves as an effective incentive for strengthening environmental governance. Low‐ranking provinces will improve their environmental policy performances in future years because of competition in the official tournament. Policy implications are drawn to improve the administrative design of environmental management.

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Section: Mandatory Target System Policy Feedback and The Official Rsupporting

confidence: 66%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 54%

“…MTS provides highpowered incentives for government officials (Kostka, 2014;Liang, 2014;Liang & Langbein, 2015;Mei, 2012).…”

Section: Mandatory Target System Policy Feedback and The Official Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Tang

Liu

2018

Review of Policy Research

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Performance evaluation, environmental regulation, and urban land green use efficiency: Evidence from China

Fan

Zhou

Xie

2023

Env Prog and Sustain Energy

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Environmental regulation plays an important role in enhancing urban land green use efficiency (ULGUE), while economic and environmental performance evaluation may also impact ULGUE in the Chinese context. Using data from 282 prefecture-level cities in China from 2006 to 2019, this article empirically tests the impacts of performance evaluation and environmental regulation on ULGUE by establishing a two-way fixed-effect model. The results show that environmental regulation has a significant contribution to ULGUE. However, environmental regulation also significantly increase carbon emissions from urban construction land, which is mainly influenced by the Chinese government's performance assessment. Therefore, the effect of performance evaluation is also examined. Economic performance evaluation is detrimental to environmental regulation and ULGUE, while environmental performance evaluation significantly contribute to both. Furthermore, economic performance evaluation and environmental regulation can synergistically promote ULGUE, however, environmental performance evaluation failed to have the same synergistic effect. Notably, when the ratio of economic performance evaluation to environmental performance evaluation was 2:8, performance evaluation and environmental regulation reached the optimal level for promoting ULGUE. Therefore, to improve ULGUE, it is necessary to establish and strengthen the constraint mechanism of environmental regulation on carbon emission from urban construction land. Meanwhile, local governments' performance assessment mechanism must be improved and the ratio of economic to environmental performance evaluation should be reasonably configured.

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Moving beyond gross domestic product: The impacts of gross domestic product‐centric cadre performance targets shift on environmental protection

Zeng,

Bao

2024

Public Admin & Development

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The impacts of the economic matrix, particularly the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), within the cadre performance target system (CPTS) on the trade‐offs between local environment and economy have been extensively researched. However, few studies have adequately considered the transition from a single‐target to a multi‐target system and the effects of dynamic changes in this system. This study addresses this gap by assessing the causal effects of China's historic adjustment of GDP‐centric CPTS on local environmental quality. By introducing a dynamic analytical framework of CPTS and employing a time‐varying Difference‐in‐Differences (DiD) design with county‐level data from 2009 to 2018, this study reveals two key findings: (1) Counties that shifted away from a GDP‐centric performance target system experienced a significant average reduction in PM2.5 pollution levels by 6.6%, highlighting the environmental benefits of moving beyond GDP‐focused CPTS; (2) The observed environmental improvements are driven by two mechanisms—correcting land misallocation and optimizing industrial structure. This study advances previous static and single‐goal analyses by introducing a dynamic, multi‐target perspective to cadre performance target‐setting.

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Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China

Cited by 142 publications

References 119 publications

Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Performance evaluation, environmental regulation, and urban land green use efficiency: Evidence from China

Moving beyond gross domestic product: The impacts of gross domestic product‐centric cadre performance targets shift on environmental protection

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