Perfect war and its contestations

Demmers, Jolle; Gould, Lauren; Snetselaar, David

doi:10.5040/9781501360282.ch-013

Cited by 2 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…What we analyse here is not the assembling and outsourcing of warfare as such. Instead, we contribute to a resurgent scholarship on the evolving ontology of war (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011; Demmers et al, 2020; Bousquet et al, 2020). This body of literature analyses how actors assemble authoritative knowledges on war.…”

Section: Debates: Remote Warfare and Regimes Of Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Conceptually, we break new ground on the significance of epistemic politics in legitimizing remote warfare, going beyond ‘secrecy and absence as barriers to research’ and instead pursuing these as objects of research (Kearns, 2017: 13). This also enables us to complement extant theorizations of remote warfare that focus on its technologies and actor networks with a perspective that unpacks its discourses, epistemologies and ontologies (Demmers et al, 2020). Theoretically, we extend analysis of what Rappert, Moyes and Other (2011) have called the ‘statecrafting’ of ignorance.…”

Section: Introduction: Why Don’t We Know What We Don’t Know About Haw...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

Gould

Stel

2021

Security Dialogue

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How must we understand and conceptualize the rationales and repercussions of remote warfare? This article contributes to scholarship on the ontology of remote war by analysing how Dutch officials engage with responsibility for the bombardment of an Islamic State weapons factory in Hawija, Iraq in 2015 under Operation Inherent Resolve. It observes that the main feature of Dutch officials’ accounts of Hawija is their diverse claims to not knowing about civilian casualties. Official narratives shifted from denial to secrecy to strategic ignorance. Bridging work on secrecy from the field of critical security studies with work on strategic ‘unknowing’ from ignorance studies, we propose a new take on the Foucauldian notion of ‘regimes of truth’. The regimes of truth that emerge to justify shifts to remote warfare – that it is riskless, precise and caring for civilian others – rely not merely on secrecy and denial but on feigned and imposed ignorance about casualties. Whereas denial can be disproven and secrecy has an expiration date, ignorance is more elusive and open-ended and hence politically convenient in different ways. Deliberate unknowing does not just postpone investigation and accountability but fundamentally and indefinitely obstructs it and thus sustains the regimes of truth for future remote wars.

show abstract

Section: Debates: Remote Warfare and Regimes Of Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction: Why Don’t We Know What We Don’t Know About Haw...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

Gould

Stel

2021

Security Dialogue

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…21 For Demmers and Gould, liquid warfare is about 'flexible, open-ended, "pop-up" military interventions, supported by remote technology and reliant on local partnerships and private contractors, through which (coalitions of) parties aim to promote and protect interests'. 22 For Mutschler, it is about mobility, precision and inaccessibility (of the state waging liquid warfare), as well as 'the avoidance of responsibilities and costs that come along with the control over territory.' 23 Liquid warfare is thus characterised principally by dynamism.…”

Section: Consent and Modern 'Liquid' Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The reliance on 'local partnerships' within the contemporary turn to liquid warfare operations 24 highlights the central role played by consent in this type of conflict. The consent of a state to intervention enables intervening states to conduct remote operations against non-state armed groups with far greater mobility than would otherwise be possible, while eliminating the need to exert territorial control.…”

Section: Consent and Modern 'Liquid' Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Conducted almost exclusively without 'boots on the ground' and with heavy reliance on remote technology, the US operation in Pakistan is a clear example of liquid warfare: the use of MQ-1B Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones has enabled the US to carry out an operation that is openended, 'pop-up' and flexible. 58 The Reaper and Predator drones are flown by pilots at an undisclosed US military base far from where the missiles impact, 59 and each possesses a loiter time of up to 14 hours, 60 advanced targeting systems and guided munitions. 61 As such these weapons systems enable the projection of US military force with a fluidity that would be unavailable to troops confined to the ground, or even to traditional jets which are bound by factors such as pilot fatigue.…”

Section: Us Intervention In Pakistanmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Intervention by (secret) invitation: searching for a requirement of publicity in the international law on the use of force with consent

Brookman-Byrne

2020

Journal on the Use of Force and International Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In light of evolving practices of conflict-the move to remote, light-foot, long-term, 'liquid' interventions-interrogations into the manner in which one state can consent to the use of force by another on its territory (intervention by invitation) have become increasingly pressing. In Pakistan, the US carried out remote airstrikes for nine years on the basis of secret consent, raising the question of how secrecy impacts upon the validity of consent to the use of force: whether secrecy renders consent invalid or, put differently, whether valid consent contains a requirement of publicity. Examining, state responsibility, jus ad bellum, and examples of state practice between 1944 and the present, this article considers the question of publicity, finding that, though there is a tendency towards the publication of consent, in a doctrinal legal sense there is insufficient evidence to suggest an obligation to publicise. This article argues that, due to the absence of such a requirement, consent is not a rule that restricts the use of force, but one that enables it; it is a doctrine that lends itself to the service of hegemony and the projection of power by states, and it must be recognised as such.

show abstract

Perfect war and its contestations

Cited by 2 publications

References 15 publications

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

Strategic ignorance and the legitimation of remote warfare: The Hawija bombardments

Intervention by (secret) invitation: searching for a requirement of publicity in the international law on the use of force with consent

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About