Perfect Deterrence

Abstract

An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.

Do States Play Signaling Games?

“…They are thus potentially more falsifiable than models that generate less precise predictions about what decision-makers will learn from signals. Models with these characteristics have been applied to a number of areas in international politics, including war initiation (Fearon, 1995;Powell, 1999), crisis bargaining (Banks, 1990;Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1997), nuclear strategy (Powell, 1990), deterrence (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000), regional integration (Schneider and Cederman, 1994), international bargaining (Fearon, 1998), arms races (Downs and Rocke, 1990), the democratic peace (Schultz, 1999), and alliance politics (Smith, 1995 types, and these, in combination with their preferences over outcomes, determine the strategies that they play. If player 1 is nice, she will chose C if she believes that player 2 is also nice, but will chose D if she believes player 2 is mean.…”

The emergence of stability: deterrence-in-motion and deterrence reconstructed

“….'. 41 While the former theory considers that the key to international stability resides in the structure and distribution of power in the international system, the other, 'focuses on the interplay of outcomes, preferences, and choices in determining interstate conflict behavior'. 42 Some have consequently viewed strategic stability in terms of achieving a central or strategic balance, which could be attained via specific force deployments and the negotiation of formal arms control measures.…”

Strategic Binary Choice Models with Partial Observability

“…Consider, for example, a model of the effectiveness of extended deterrence, i.e. a defender's ability to deter an attack on a protégé (Schelling, 1960;Zagare and Kilgour, 2000). Successful deterrence is, of course, the outcome of a strategic interaction between the defender and the attacker.…”