Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Ghidoni, Riccardo; Cleave, Blair L.; Suetens, Sigrid

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…We may not exclude that this choice might miss the impact of group size on the level of cooperation or possible interactions of the cooperation level with conflict decisions. Indeed, the size of the matching group may matter in pairwise interactions with stranger matching ( 33 ). Nonetheless, we believe that at the scale we are discussing here, these effects should not be very important.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the interplay of hierarchies, conflicts, and cooperation: An experimental approach

2022

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Previous research suggests that it is difficult to maintain cooperation in a large society when there is a strong hierarchical structure. In this study, we implement online human experiments to study the effects of exogenous variation in a particular notion of hierarchy on cooperation and conflict within groups. We demonstrate how cooperation can be maintained when collective action is accompanied by dyadic conflicts whose outcome feeds back on the hierarchical rank of the contestants. We find that the majority of individuals take part in conflicts and that highly-ranked individuals mostly cooperate and engage in conflicts as a way to punish non-cooperators. As a consequence, stable hierarchical groups can arise and maintain high levels of cooperation. Our results are in agreement with the prediction of earlier theoretical models on hierarchical societies and are relevant to understanding the interplay of hierarchy, cooperation and conflict.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the interplay of hierarchies, conflicts, and cooperation: An experimental approach

2022

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“…Avoiding retaliation effects is ensured, by a low rematching probability. Previous evidence demonstrates that the results of imperfect stranger matching at a rematching probability of .2 or lower equal those of perfect stranger settings (see Ghidoni et al, 2018). As participants played in groups of eight to 12 participants, the rematching probability between two rounds ranged from .14 to .09, and from .13 to .08, when playing outgroup rounds.…”

Section: Materials and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Behavioral Game. For Study 1 we used a continuous prisoner's dilemma with a complete stranger procedure (Ghidoni et al, 2018), whereby participants are not only randomly assigned to a partner at the beginning of each round, but also know that they will never play against the same person twice. This is important, as we are interested in expectations and cooperation toward the group rather than a given individual, and thus wished to avoid retaliation effects, which might occur if a person expects to playing with the same person twice.…”

Section: Materials and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic contact effects: Individuals’ positive and negative contact history influences intergroup contact effects in a behavioral game.

Schäfer¹,

Simsek²,

Jaspers³

et al. 2022

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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Positive contact between members of different groups reduces prejudice and increases cooperation, findings known as intergroup contact effects. Yet in real-world settings not only positive, but also negative intergroup contact occurs, which have opposing effects. To date little is known about whether and how an individual's valenced history of intergroup contact influences contact effects and how this dynamic change happens during specific instances of intergroup contact. A pilot study examined the psychological impact of a novel paradigm to assess intergroup contact using a behavioral game. We then conducted two studies, which allowed us to observe a sequence of up to 23 in-and outgroup interactions and their behavioral outcomes in a continuous prisoner's dilemma behavioral game (N = 116, 2,668 interactions; N = 89, 1,513 interactions). As expected, participants showed a clear ingroup bias in expectations and cooperation. Furthermore, the quality of contact history moderated contact effects. Specifically, intergroup contact following a positive history of intergroup contact had a stronger effect on intergroup expectations than contact following a negative history thereof. Findings are discussed in view of the importance of considering the valenced history of intergroup contact, as well as new research questions on intergroup contact that can be addressed with this novel contact paradigm.

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“…For example, it has been observed that people more often choose to cooperate with the same person through several rounds, than to cooperate with a new person from round to round (e.g. Ghidoni et al, 2019; Keser & Van Winden, 2000). In this setting, participants are aware that their partner will be able to continuously monitor their moves and thus regulate their level of cooperation accordingly, which rises a caution in participants and results in increased cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation after social exclusion: To reconnect or to harm?

Đorić

2023

PsyCh Journal

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Predicting a person's reaction after experiencing exclusion is an important question, which is accompanied by paradoxical answers. An excluded person may tend to harm others (antisocial reaction hypothesis), treat them with increased ingratiation (prosocial reaction hypothesis), or withdraw from further social contacts. The aim of this study was to test the hypotheses about the prosocial and antisocial responses in the social dilemma context, specifically, to examine whether social exclusion will result in reduced or increased cooperation in the Trust Game. The sample included 175 participants (females = 142), first‐ and second‐year psychology students. There was a between‐subject design 3 exclusion (exclusion vs. inclusion vs. neutral) × 2 history (known vs. unknown partner), with Social value orientation being treated as a covariate. Social exclusion was manipulated using the get‐acquainted paradigm, and the Trust Game was used to measure the willingness to cooperate. The level of social value orientation was measured using the Social Value Orientations (SVO) Slider Measure. Despite the successful manipulation of social exclusion, the results do not support studies showing that exclusion influences cooperation in a mixed‐motive situation. Only the main effects of the history were observed (p = .012, η2 = .04.), and social value orientation was a significant predictor of the level of cooperation (p ≤ .001, η2 = .08.). The conclusion is that the experience of social exclusion made participants no less able to analyze social cues and willing to cooperate in the Trust Game.

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Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Cited by 10 publications

References 48 publications

On the interplay of hierarchies, conflicts, and cooperation: An experimental approach

On the interplay of hierarchies, conflicts, and cooperation: An experimental approach

Dynamic contact effects: Individuals’ positive and negative contact history influences intergroup contact effects in a behavioral game.

Cooperation after social exclusion: To reconnect or to harm?

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