Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor

Abstract

The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly false; and (3) to provide some additional arguments for, and illustrations of, the theoretical character of all observation judgments.

How we load our data sets with theories and why we do so purposefully

“…For example, when we say that our observations are theory-laden, we can mean that our observation reports are couched in theoretical vocabulary (see Chalmers 2013;Churchland 1988;Kuhn 1962 for examples). We can also mean that our theoretical conjectures have directed our attention towards a certain observable phenomenon (see Couvalis 1997;Brewer and Lambert 2001 for examples).…”

Diversity and Unity of Modularity

“…It is well known in neuroscience that the basic units of brain functions are not found at the level of a single cell but of a network of cells. That is, brain functioning is a matter of interaction among sets or structures of neurons (Churchland 1986;Churchland & Sejnowski, 1989, p. 43). The best anatomical evidence for the existence of these groups of neurons is the columnar organization of the neocortex.…”

“…But, there are some cross-modal effects, such as the McGurk effect (McGurk & McDonald, 1976). Fodor (1983, p. 132) Fodor (1984Fodor ( , 1988 and Churchland (1988). 13.…”

An ecological approach to cognitive (im)penetrability

“…Indeed, there is recent evidence that attention can have long term effects (Desimone 1996) as well as transitory ones. Some writers (e.g., Churchland 1988) have argued that the presence of centripetal nerve fibers running from higher cortical centers to the visual cortex constitutes prima facie evidence that vision must be susceptible to cognitive influences. However, the role of the centripetal fibers remains unclear except where it has been shown that they are concerned with the allocation of attention.…”