Perception of images moving at saccadic velocities during saccades and during fixation

Brooks, Barbara A.; Yates, J. Terry; Coleman, Ryan

doi:10.1007/bf00236664

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Although temporal masking is often attributed to stimuli covering the entire display (Castet et al, 2002) or even the entire visual field (Campbell & Wurtz, 1978), it is possible to achieve similar effects with just simple flashes of light without a necessary spatial or retinal overlap, an effect attributed to meta-contrast masking (Matin et al, 1972). Interestingly, this mechanism has been shown to be equally effective both during real and simulated saccades (Brooks et al, 1980;Brooks et al, 1981). The absence of post-saccadic masking, however, is not representative for the circumstances of natural vision, where every intra-saccadic input is followed (and thus masked) by a more reliable and stable retinal image (Castet, 2010).…”

Section: Visual Processing Of Intra-saccadic Motion Smearmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intra-saccadic motion streaks as cues to linking object locations across saccades

Schweitzer

Rolfs

2020

Journal of Vision

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When visual objects shift rapidly across the retina, they produce motion blur. Intra-saccadic visual signals, caused incessantly by our own saccades, are thought to be eliminated at early stages of visual processing. Here we investigate whether they are still available to the visual system and could-in principle-be used as cues for localizing objects as they change locations on the retina. Using a high-speed projection system, we developed a trans-saccadic identification task in which brief but continuous intra-saccadic object motion was key to successful performance. Observers made a saccade to a target stimulus that moved rapidly either up or down, strictly during the eye movement. Just as the target reached its final position, an identical distractor stimulus appeared on the opposite side, resulting in a display of two identical stimuli upon saccade landing. Observers had to identify the original target using the only available clue: the target's intra-saccadic movement. In an additional replay condition, we presented the observers' own intra-saccadic retinal stimulus trajectories during fixation. Compared to the replay condition, task performance was impaired during saccades but recovered fully when a post-saccadic blank was introduced. Reverse regression analyses and confirmatory experiments showed that performance increased markedly when targets had long movement durations, low spatial frequencies, and orientations parallel to their retinal trajectory-features that promote intra-saccadic motion streaks. Although the potential functional role of intra-saccadic visual signals is still unclear, our results suggest that they could provide cues to tracking objects that rapidly change locations across saccades.

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Section: Visual Processing Of Intra-saccadic Motion Smearmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intra-saccadic motion streaks as cues to linking object locations across saccades

Schweitzer

Rolfs

2020

Journal of Vision

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“…The importance of masking during ordinary viewing was also recently emphasized by Brooks, Yates, and Coleman (1980), who showed that vision for moving images during saccades may be as sensitive and accurate as during fixation if preand postsaccadic masking influences are carefully eliminated.…”

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confidence: 97%

Backward and forward masking associated with saccadic eye movement

Brooks

Impelman

Lum

1981

Perception & Psychophysics

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Visual masking effects on test flash thresholds were measured under real and simulated eye movement conditions to determine whether visual masking is primarily responsible for elevations in threshold that are sometimes associated with saccadic eye movements. Brief luminous flashes presented to the central retina before, during, and after saccades were masked by stimuli presented either pre-or postsaccadically. The amount and time course of masking were quantitatively dependent on stimulus parameters of intensity and temporal separation and were unaffected by eye movement parameters (amplitude, velocity, direction) as long as retinal stimulus conditions were constant. The duration of forward masking was longer than that of backward masking. When retinal conditions during saccades were mimicked while the eyes were held steady, masking interactions were identical to those obtained during real saccades. These results indicate that masking effects during saccades in ordinary environments are determined solely by the stimulus situation at the retina. Putative nonvisual, centrally originating saccadic suppression suggested by other authors is evidently not additive with visually determined masking during saccades.

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“…Dennett suggests, and I agree, that this expectation is based on a folk-theoretical belief that vision presents us with a relatively uniformly clear and colored world in which objects are easily distinguished. But, as this simple demonstration shows, as do other more rigorous experiments, e.g., Brooks et al (1980), this is at best only true of the foveated world, and even then with some exceptions (Caplovitz et al, 2008). 2 …”

Section: The Occasionality Problem and Unconscious Representations Ofmentioning

confidence: 66%

What makes us conscious of our own agency? And why the conscious versus unconscious representation distinction matters

Carruthers

2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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Existing accounts of the sense of agency tend to focus on the proximal causal history of the feeling. That is, they explain the sense of agency by describing the cognitive mechanism that causes the sense of agency to be elicited. However, it is possible to elicit an unconscious representation of one’s own agency that plays a different role in a cognitive system. I use the “occasionality problem” to suggest that taking this distinction seriously has potential theoretical pay-offs for this reason. We are faced, then, with a need to distinguish instances of the representation of one’s own agency in which the subject is aware of their sense of own agency from instances in which they are not. This corresponds to a specific instance of what Dennett calls the “Hard Question”: once the representation is elicited, then what happens? In other words, how is a representation of one’s own agency used in a cognitive system when the subject is aware of it? How is this different from when the representation of own agency remains unconscious? This phrasing suggests a Functionalist answer to the Hard Question. I consider two single function hypotheses. First, perhaps the representation of own agency enters into the mechanisms of attention. This seems unlikely as, in general, attention is insufficient for awareness. Second, perhaps, a subject is aware of their sense of agency when it is available for verbal report. However, this seems inconsistent with evidence of a sense of agency in the great apes. Although these two single function views seem like dead ends, multifunction hypotheses such as the global workspace theory remain live options which we should consider. I close by considering a non-functionalist answer to the Hard Question: perhaps it is not a difference in the use to which the representation is put, but a difference in the nature of the representation itself. When it comes to the sense of agency, the Hard Question remains, but there are alternatives open to us.

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Perception of images moving at saccadic velocities during saccades and during fixation

Cited by 17 publications

References 29 publications

Intra-saccadic motion streaks as cues to linking object locations across saccades

Intra-saccadic motion streaks as cues to linking object locations across saccades

Backward and forward masking associated with saccadic eye movement

What makes us conscious of our own agency? And why the conscious versus unconscious representation distinction matters

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