“…I will call this the environment-encompassing view of experience since it conceives of the metaphysical structure of experience as encompassing the environment in which the subject is enjoying a certain phenomenology. Versions of this view have been defended by Campbell (2002), Martin (2002), and Brewer (2006) among others. The motivations for thinking that experience is fundamentally representational typically go hand in hand with the motivations for embracing the mental state view.…”
Section: Particularity and Austere Representationalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Campbell (2002) calls his view the ''relational view'',Martin (2002) calls his ''naïve realism'', whileBrewer (2007) calls his the ''object view''. I will refer to the view as ''austere relationalism'' since the most distinctive features of the view are arguably the central role of relations between perceiving subjects and the world as well as its austerity: the view is austere insofar as it denies that experience has any substantive representational component.…”
I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.There are two radically different conceptions of perceptual experience. According to relationalism, perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of standing in an awareness or an acquaintance relation to objects. According to representationalism, perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of representing objects. Relationalism and representationalism are widely considered to be in conflict. 1 I aim to show that they are not in conflict with one another and, indeed, that perceptual experience is best thought of as fundamentally both relational and representational.
“…I will call this the environment-encompassing view of experience since it conceives of the metaphysical structure of experience as encompassing the environment in which the subject is enjoying a certain phenomenology. Versions of this view have been defended by Campbell (2002), Martin (2002), and Brewer (2006) among others. The motivations for thinking that experience is fundamentally representational typically go hand in hand with the motivations for embracing the mental state view.…”
Section: Particularity and Austere Representationalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Campbell (2002) calls his view the ''relational view'',Martin (2002) calls his ''naïve realism'', whileBrewer (2007) calls his the ''object view''. I will refer to the view as ''austere relationalism'' since the most distinctive features of the view are arguably the central role of relations between perceiving subjects and the world as well as its austerity: the view is austere insofar as it denies that experience has any substantive representational component.…”
I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.There are two radically different conceptions of perceptual experience. According to relationalism, perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of standing in an awareness or an acquaintance relation to objects. According to representationalism, perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of representing objects. Relationalism and representationalism are widely considered to be in conflict. 1 I aim to show that they are not in conflict with one another and, indeed, that perceptual experience is best thought of as fundamentally both relational and representational.
“…Representationalist views misconstrue the phenomenological basis of perceptual states insofar as they detach the phenomenal character of perceptual states from relations to qualitative features of the environment (e.g. Campbell 2002, Martin 2002, Brewer 2007.…”
“…On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you (2002, p. 116; similarly Martin 2002a, p. 393 and Brewer 2007, p. 92f.…”
Section: The Argument For Relational Contentmentioning
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.
P1:If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering from blindsight etc.), then she is aware of the world. P2: If a subject is aware of the world, then the world seems a certain way to her. P3: If the world seems a certain way to her, then she has an experience with content C, where C corresponds to the way the world seems to her. Conclusion 1: If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering from blindsight etc.), then she has an experience with content C, where C corresponds to the way the world seems to her. P4: The world is either the way it seems to her or it is different from the way it seems to her. P5: If a subject has an experience with content C, then C is either accurate (if the world is the way it seems to her) or inaccurate (if the world is not the way it seems to her).
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