Perceiving the weird and the wonderful. The mysterious metaphysics of phenomenology, art and science.

Abstract

What is it that appears to us: an objective reality or a subjective illusion? A brief history of the continental philosophical approach to this question is given, followed by an introduction to the recent continental movement toward Realism, which accepts there must be mind-independent entities of some kind. Yet if such an objective reality exists this raises the problem of how we can possibly conceptualise what exists and happens there, since by definition it is beyond our concepts — or at least beyond our current ones. Hence it seems mysterious, weird and wonderful. I illustrate how the arts and sciences have independently approached this question, and suggest some commonalities in their conclusions. Finally, I discuss the importance of individual differences in how we perceive and think.

The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.

“…On the long view, this is a manifestation of the millennia-old debate between metaphysical realism 1 and anti-realism (reviewed by McMahon, 2001;Braver, 2013;Pagden, 2013;Sebold, 2014;Wolin, 2019). In a survey of the last century (Rose, 2021), I argued that the cognitive sciences, neuroscience and Gibsonianism fall within the realist camp, while continental phenomenology has its roots in anti-realism, and is thus in danger of sliding into idealism, motivated by antiscientific attitudes and the fear of nihilism. 2 Here, I consider some compromise or hybrid solutions, which might dissolve if not solve the disagreement between these extreme alternative worldviews.…”

“…Although it sounds like a perfectly straightforward realist ontology -organisms move and evolve in a physical environment, developing an extended mind with broad teleofunctional 4 content (Wright, 1973;Millikan, 2004;Rose, 2006, ch. 5;2012a) -links are often made between embodiment and 1 The distinction between continental and analytic philosophy is controversial, but I will continue to use it here as a convenient shorthand (see Brown, 2015, andRose, 2021, for further discussion).…”

“…2) argues that talk about 'embodiment', 'praxis' and 'lifeworld' is merely part of the "rhetoric of concreteness" (p. 69) that phenomenologists use in their attempts to distance themselves from idealism -to prevent themselves from being "seduced by antirealism" (Sebold, 2014, p. 248). (There has of course been controversy over this point, which is discussed in Rose, 2021. ) 3 For brevity, I'm treating enactivism, embodiment, sensorimotor and embedded as synonyms for the same (family-resembling) class of theories, despite the terminological nuances (e.g.…”