Perceived Project Value, Opportunistic Behavior, Interorganizational Cooperation, and Contractor Performance

Abstract

Predictors of contractor performance have attracted the attention of researchers in the developed world. However, research from sub-Saharan Africa to corroborate these findings has remained sparse. What exists is speculative and at best anecdotal. Using data from construction firms in Uganda, this study finds that commitment to the project, perceived value of the project, interorganizational cooperation, and opportunistic behavior are significant predictors of contractor performance. This has both policy and managerial implications, which we present in this paper.

Outsourced contracts, buyer-supplier trust, supplier opportunistic behavior and supplier performance in ugandan public procuring and disposing entities (PDEs)

“…In carrying out economic exchange, Contracts specify the terms and arrangements for the parties involved (Goo, Kishore, Rao & Nam, 2009). The contract is a formal written agreement that is legally binding between two or more competent parties, which creates obligations, whereby one party becomes bound to another to do or omit to do certain acts that are the subject of that contract (Ntayi et al, 2010b). This implies that contracts provide the framework for the economic exchange, outlining the nature and terms of the relationship, what is to be provided and the rights and obligations of parties to the contract.…”

“…Trust is conceptualized as a firm's willingness to rely on an exchange partner whose behavior is not under its control (Ntayi et al, 2010b). Trust is the firm's belief that another party will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm as well as not take unexpected actions that will result in negative outcomes (Stefanie et al, 2010).…”

“…Supplier opportunistic behavior involves the use of incomplete or distorted disclosure of information especially with calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse a buyer during a contracted buyer/supplier relationship. Examples of supplier opportunistic behavior include such acts as withholding or distorting information and or failing to fulfill promises or obligations as outlined in a contractual agreement (Ntayi et al, 2010b). Supplier opportunistic behavior is seen as seeking gain for oneself at the expense of others and such behavior is usually associated with breaches of contract (Stefanie et al, 2010).…”

“…Supplier opportunistic behaviour is "self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1979). Ntayi, Rooks, Eyaa and Qian (2010b) further describe guile as "lying, stealing, cheating and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse." Neo classical economic theory posits that firms outsource to attain cost advantages from assumed economies of scale and scope possessed by vendors (Ang & Straub, 1998).…”

“…Ntayi et al (2010a) sought to explain procurement officers' deviant behavior using moral disengagement, work anomie, perceived normative conflict, and procurement planning behavior as predictor variables. Ntayi et al (2010b) examined how perceived project value, opportunistic behavior, and interorganizational cooperation affected contractor performance. Eyaa and Nagitta (2011) examined the nature of noncompliance in Ugandan public procurement contracts.…”