Perceived equity and unionization propensity in China

Abstract

Purpose -This study aims to examine the relationship between employees' perceived equity and their propensity to unionize in China and the moderating effect of tenure on the relationship. Design/methodology/approach -A survey was administered to 160 employees in a foreign-invested company in China which had experienced a spontaneous labor strike seven months before the study. Findings -The results supported the hypothesis regarding the relationship between workers' perceived equity and their unionization propensity in China. In addition, employee tenure was found to moderate this relationship such that the longer the tenure, the weaker the relationship between perceived equity and unionization propensity. Originality/value -This study provides evidence of the external validity of the relationship between perceived equity and workers' unionization propensity in China. It also demonstrates the different roles employee tenure plays in the relationship. Specifically, senior workers were less likely to join spontaneous unions in China than junior workers when treatment was perceived to be unfair, a noteworthy contrast to existing research findings that senior workers in Western societies are more eager to get involved in union activities than junior workers.

Understanding labor conflicts in Chinese manufacturing: a Yin-Yang harmony perspective

“…Taking a deeper look at the behavior of the provincial trade union in our case, we discovered that their strategic actions to a certain extent mirror the core spirit of Yin-Yang harmony and the 5C model. Despite supporting the workers to effectively voice their worries and grievances, the union was not able to completely represent the interests of the workers because its eventual goal was to maintain a harmonious labor relation and stable productivity for the factory due to its political role in safeguarding the interests of the country (Chan, 2014;Wang, 2011).…”

“…More specifically, Chinese unions comply with a hierarchical system in which the ACFTU stands at the top governing three sub-level unions (provincial, local/city, county and town and workplace-based/corporate levels). According to the Trade Union Law 2001 and the Trade Union Constitution 2003, all workers in China enjoy the freedom to join a union, but this union must be approved and supervised by the ACFTU, the only permitted official union organization (Wang, 2011;Metcalf and Li, 2007). Also, the union leaders of higher local levels (i.e.…”

“…As noted, unlike Western labor unions acting as the representative and spokesman of grass root workers, in China's socialist market economy, ACFTU as an organ of the CCP is not only mandated to represent the interests of the workers but also has clear goals on facilitating the government to ensure some degree of control and influence over private enterprises, particularly those foreign-invested companies, and enhancing incentives of investment and economic growth (Wang, 2011;Bai, 2011). Arguably, with such state-mandated nature, ACFTU may not be able to best serve and protect the interests of laborers, but rather the interests of the country (Wang, 2011). Metcalf and Li (2007) have indicated that when the conflicts show a conspicuous infringement of individual worker rights by management, Chinese unions are very willing to represent the interests of the employees.…”