People represent mental states in terms of rationality, social impact, and valence: Validating the 3d Mind Model

Thornton, Mark Allen; Tamir, Diana

doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2019.12.012

Cited by 29 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…, 2016 ; Koster-Hale et al. , 2017 ; Thornton and Tamir, 2020 ). It has been suggested that representing these dimensions may facilitate social predictions ( Tamir and Thornton, 2018 ; Thornton and Tamir, 2020 ), an idea supported by other works demonstrating that neural response in ToM brain regions can be characterized within a predictive coding framework ( Carter et al.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The representation of mental state information in schizophrenia and first-degree relatives: a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data

Dodell-Feder

Tully

Dudek

et al. 2021

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

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Individuals with a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder (SSD) and those at familial high-risk (FHR) for SSDs experience social difficulties that are related to neural abnormalities in the network of brain regions recruited during theory of mind (ToM). Prior work with these groups has focused almost exclusively on characterizing involvement of these regions in ToM. Here, we examine the representational content of these regions using multivariate pattern analysis. We analyzed two previously collected datasets of SSD, FHR, and control participants who, while undergoing fMRI, completed the false-belief task in which they read stories describing beliefs or physical representations (e.g., photographs). Univariate and multivariate analyses were performed in regions-of-interest to evaluate group differences in task-based activation and representational content, respectively. Compared to non-SSD, SSD showed reduced decoding accuracy for the category of mental states in right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ)—which was related to false-belief accuracy—and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), and reduced involvement of DMPFC for mental state understanding. FHR showed no differences in decoding accuracy or involvement compared to non-FHR. Given prior studies of disrupted neural involvement in FHR, and the lack of decoding differences observed here, the onset of illness may involve processes that corrupt how mental state information is represented.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the degree to which a mental state influences social relationships) ( Tamir et al. , 2016 ; Thornton and Tamir, 2020 ), the epistemic context of a mental state (i.e. how a belief was formed and the justification for the belief) ( Koster-Hale et al.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The representation of mental state information in schizophrenia and first-degree relatives: a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data

Dodell-Feder

Tully

Dudek

et al. 2021

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

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“…Similarly, a low-dimensional map we have termed the 3d Mind Model accounts for much of the organization of mental state representations ( 36 ). The dimensions of this mental state map—rationality, social impact, and valence—explain behavioral judgments of mental states, neural activity elicited by thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings, as well as the semantic similarity between state words estimated using text analysis ( 37 ). On both maps—ACT-FAST and 3d Mind Model—proximity reflects conceptual similarity: Similar actions (e.g., walking and running) and similar states (e.g., happiness and pride) tend to be close together within their respective map.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A person’s mind need not recall every nuance about every action to effectively understand that action. Rather, it needs only to track an action on six dimensions to maintain a useful conceptual summary of that action ( 36 , 37 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

People accurately predict the transition probabilities between actions

Thornton

Tamir

2021

Sci. Adv.

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Social life is a complex dance. To coordinate gracefully with one’s partners, one must predict their actions. Here, we investigated how people predict others’ actions. We hypothesized that people can accurately predict others’ future actions based on knowledge of their current actions, coupled with knowledge of action transitions. To test whether people have accurate knowledge of the transition probabilities between actions, we compared actual rates of action transitions—calculated from four large naturalistic datasets—to participants’ ratings of the transition probabilities between corresponding sets of actions. In five preregistered studies, participants demonstrated accurate mental models of action transitions. Furthermore, we found that people drew upon conceptual knowledge of actions—described by the six-dimensional ACT-FASTaxonomy—to guide their accurate predictions. Together, these results indicate that people can accurately anticipate other people’s moves in the dance of social life and that the structure of action knowledge may be tailored to making these predictions.

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“…Technically, we cannot assume that situations directly cause behavior but have to assume that situations or their appraisals impact people who in turn respond with behavior. Previous research has indeed documented that people process others' mental states when thinking about eliciting situations (e.g., Thornton & Tamir, 2020).…”

Section: Spontaneous State Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spontaneous state inferences.

Kruse¹,

Degner²

2021

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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Perceivers routinely draw inferences about others from their behavior in an attempt to make sense of the world. Previous research has established that spontaneous inferences include stable characteristics such as traits and a number of variable person-related concepts such as goals, intentions, and motivations. The current research investigated the occurrence of more general spontaneous state inferences. In a series of four pre-registered studies (N = 883), we adapted two established experimental paradigms frequently used in spontaneous social inference research to the investigation of spontaneous trait and state inferences. In Studies 1 and 2, we observed evidence for the occurrence of spontaneous state inferences from state-implying statements. In Studies 3 and 4, we observed the simultaneous occurrence of spontaneous trait and state inferences from statements that allowed for both inferences. In a fifth study (N = 97), we provide evidence that people represent states and traits as functionally di↵erent: Participants judged the likelihood of behavioral repetition higher when the same behavior was related to a trait-inference than a state-inference. The observation of multiple simultaneous spontaneous inferences in the current research suggests that further theory building regarding the underlying mechanisms and processes of spontaneous impression formation in person perception from behavior is warranted.

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People represent mental states in terms of rationality, social impact, and valence: Validating the 3d Mind Model

Cited by 29 publications

References 40 publications

The representation of mental state information in schizophrenia and first-degree relatives: a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data

The representation of mental state information in schizophrenia and first-degree relatives: a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data

People accurately predict the transition probabilities between actions

Spontaneous state inferences.

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