Pensions and the path to gerontocracy in Germany

Sinn, Hans‐Werner; Uebelmesser, Silke

doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(02)00134-9

Cited by 111 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…They account for a large share of the voting population; they veto proposals to reform benefit schemes; and, they impose high-tax rates on the working population in order to finance generous benefits for the elderly (see for example Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin 2003;Sinn & Uebelmesser 2002;Monten & Thum 2010). At a particular point in time, it would not matter whether these age-related spending preferences result from different life-cycle interests, cohort effects or period-specific factors.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does aging affect preferences for welfare spending? A study of peoples' spending preferences in 22 countries, 1985–2006

Sørensen

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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A recurrent assertion is that aging will intensify age-related conflict over public budget allocation. If people are led by their self-interest, the young will prioritize public education services, while the elderly will demand better pensions and health-care services. Addressing this issue requires longitudinal survey data and estimation of age (life-cycle), period and cohort effects. Except for a few of studies based on US data, such analyses are non-existent. We use repeated cross-section survey-data for 22 countries. Respondents are classified into ten-year age-groups and birth decades, and we estimate a regression model explaining respondents' public spending preferences. When period and cohort effects are taken into account, elderly people want less education spending, and more health care and pension spending. These life-cycle effects vary considerably between countries, but are generally quite small. Preferences also appear mostly unrelated to left-right party choice.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does aging affect preferences for welfare spending? A study of peoples' spending preferences in 22 countries, 1985–2006

Sørensen

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…In particular, the impact on capital markets [e.g., Abel (2001), Boersch-Supan et al (2002), Krueger and Ludwig (2007), Poterba (2001Poterba ( , 2004] and on public pension schemes [e.g. Breyer and Stolte (2001), Casamatta et al (2001), Demange and Laroque (1999), Fehr (2000), Sinn and Uebelmesser (2002)] has been extensively studied.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Breyer and Stolte (2001) and Sinn and Uebelmesser (2002) take a political economy point of view on public pension reforms. Similar to our paper, Sinn and Uebelmesser (2002) consider the power of the old in a gerontocratic society.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ageing municipalities, gerontocracy and fiscal competition

Montén

Thum

2010

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We develop a simple model of fiscal competition among ageing municipalities. When ageing advances, gerontocracies and social planners gradually substitute publicly provided goods aimed at the mobile young population for publicly provided goods for the elderly. This substitution process does not only depend on the ageing itself but also on crowding effects and on the regional distribution of the elderly population. We show that fiscal competition prevents the exploitation of the young. When the share of the elderly is sufficiently large, the utility of the young is even higher in gerontocracies than in welfare maximizing societies. Due to fiscal competition, the gerontocracies will provide even more of the publicly provided good for the young than the social planner. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: H4, H7.

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“…Without assuming intergenerational altruism an ageing society has increasing difficulties to vote for the type of reforms necessary to stabilize the welfare state in general and the pension system in particular (Werding and Konrad, 2012). The "gerontocracy" (Sinn and Uebelmesser, 2002) is characterized by a short time-horizon and a protection of privileges for the old. Country panel analyses are consistent with this view: Heinemann shows that reform progress (measured as an increase in indicators of economic freedom) can be attributed to rational ignorance and an ageing society (2004: 21-22).…”

Section: Full Rationality and Full Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%