Pension fund governance: The Polish experience

Abstract

Despite a comprehensive pension related debate held on the governmental level and in media in Poland, little time was spent, however, on discussing nature and usefulness of governance in the context of pension systems aimed at would-be-pensioners. Attention is predominantly paid to the role of governance for investments. Unfortunately, governance is not addressed, with reference to pension funds, the way it should be. The author is looking for answers to questions about the state of pension fund governance in Poland, thus trying to find methods for improvement. Nevertheless, this text concentrates on a small fragment of the pension system in Poland. The article aims at attempting identification of issues to be faced by governance in voluntary pension funds that are managed by universal pension fund management companies.

Transition matrix and stochastic kernel for repeatability assessment of performance of Polish open pension funds

“…9770/jesi.2020.8.2(60) 985 change the fund and specified the minimum rate of return that the fund must achieve in order to be able to continue operating (Kominek, 2012;Kompa & Wiśniewski, 2015a). Competition between funds was to lead to the exclusion of inefficient entities, the anticipated creation of new funds was to prevent market monopolisation while legal regulations were to diminish the agency problem (Samborski, 2014). Without determining whether the described mechanism actually works (see, for example, (Brzeszczyński, Bohl, & Serwa, 2019;Chybalski, 2008Chybalski, , 2012Witkowska & Kompa, 2017;Witkowska, Kompa, & Mentel, 2019)), it should be noted that for the choice of the entity investing the contributions of the future pensioner, the phenomenon of repeatability and reversal of the pension fund performance is vital.…”