Peirce est-il un phénoménologue?

Elements of Peircean phenomenology: From categories to signs by way of grounds

“…Clearly, the numerical values have their part to play. However, I do not think it sufficient to say that Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness correspond to a one-place predicate, a two-place predicate, and a three-place predicate, respectively, as Ransdell (1989) maintains. Peirce probably thought so, for instance when he claimed that an act of attention has no connotation at all, but is the pure denotative power of the mind, that is to say, the power which directs the mind to an object, in contradistinction to the power of thinking any predicate of that object.…”

“…Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness mean so much more than just being the first, the second, and the third category of an obligatory segmentation of the world into triads. Peirce's phenomenology is in fact very short, as Ransdell (1989) rightly observes, because he rapidly proceeds to tasks that he takes to be beyond phenomenology. There is every reason to deplore this, in particular if we follow Peirce in identifying phenomenology with the study of the categories.…”

“…4 The others, then, would be the prototypes or ideal types. According to Ransdell (1989), all instances of signs repertoried by Peirce that are not signs in the proper sense are degenerate. If degeneracy should here be taken in the sense of mathematics, degenerate items are objects that change their nature so as to belong to another, usually simpler, class.…”

“…As I have shown elsewhere, Peirce's phenomenology is actually defined by precisely the same properties as that of Husserl, if we except Peirce's anticipation, that the analysis would bring about the three categories (see Sonesson 2013). Both Spiegelberg (1956) and Ransdell (1989) deny that there is any deeper similarity between the two phenomenologies, but it is clear from their arguments that Spiegelberg is unfamiliar with Peirce, and that Ransdell basically has no idea about Husserl. Nevertheless, the respective scholarly posterities of Peirce and Husserl have been quite different, Peirceans being busy to find out what Peirce wanted to say, and Husserleans applying the phenomenological operations to the same phenomena over and over again, as well as to new ones, which is why they have been able to add new insights (see Sonesson 2013;cf.…”

Active Motion, Communicative Aggregations, and the Spatial Closure of Umwelt

“…Peirce. As J. Ransdell 7 has noted, “Peirce believed that there is a way in which scientific understanding can be regarded as primarily teleological rather than mechanistic even in the case of the physical sciences. Roughly, his strategy was to regard mechanistic science‐the paradigm for which is, of course, Newtonian mechanics‐as a ‘degenerate’ which derives from mathematics.…”