Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Coworker Relations

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn many workplaces co-workers have the best information about each other's e¤ort. Managers may attempt to exploit this information through peer evaluation. I study peer evaluation in a pure moral hazard model of production by two limitedly liable agents. Agents receive a signal about their colleague's e¤ort level, and are asked to report it to the principal. The principal may give an individual bonus for the receipt of a positive evaluation by a colleague, which stimulates e¤ort as long as signals are revealed truthfully. A cost of lying ascertains that there can be truthful revelation. I show that interpersonal relations between colleagues constrain the bonus for receiving a positive evaluation in order to keep evaluations truthful. Still, the principal will always include such a bonus in the optimal contract, and possibly complement it with a team bonus. Co-worker relations have non-monotic e¤ects on pro…ts in the optimal contract. JEL-codes: D86, J33, M50.

Challenges of Change: An Experiment Promoting Women to Managerial Roles in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector

“…Second, we complement the diagnostic with a set of labin-the-field-experiments in which we simulate managerial exercises with a comparable sample of trainees. Third, we use evaluations by peers, a popular tool in businesses around the world to measure staff skills (Sol (2016); Edwards and Ewen (1996);Bohl (1996)). Fourth, we rely on factories' revealed preferences on which of the trainees they keep as supervisors after the initial trial.…”

The impact of peer evaluation on team effort, productivity, motivation and performance in global virtual teams

“…The perceptions that others are contributing more seem instrumental in shaping participants' decisions to contribute more themselves. Reinforcing this idea is Sol (2016), who shows that peer evaluation gives an incentive for effort, even when the evaluations are not truthful. We would, therefore, expect that overall team participation, team activity and team effort will increase with the use of peer evaluation.…”

Keeping them honest? Broad‐based employee ownership and earnings management

“…Peer or "360 " feedback is a common form of mutual monitoring in which workers evaluate the effectiveness of their peers and supervisors (Edwards & Ewen, 1996). Though such evaluations are popular in many organizations, personal relationships between workers may affect the veracity of peer evaluations and limit their effectiveness as a tool to reduce shirking (Bracken et al, 2016;Sol, 2016). This does suggest, however, that providing group incentives like ownership can encourage effective mutual monitoring to reduce shirking.…”