Peer-dependent incentives and prepaid bonuses: An experimental investigation of productivity improvement

Yang, Fanzheng

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.06.004

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Bandiera [49] studied the impact of team incentives on the average productivity of teams and found that exploiting social connections among workers was beneficial to the firms. Yang [50] presented various peer-dependent incentives deliberately designed to improve employee productivity and found that a prepaid reward combined with any peer-dependent incentive can remarkably raise worker productivity. Table 1 presents the positioning of this study.…”

Section: Incentives and Penalties For Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the government decides to adopt a negative regulatory strategy, enterprises will choose negative carbon-emission-reduction strategies. Governments and enterprises can also cooperate in carbon reduction [50]. The study of governments' and enterprises' strategy selection within a collaborative framework is left to be studied in future research.…”

Section: Assumption 1 the Two Parties Of The Game Are The Government ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The peer incentive or peer-dependent incentive is a mechanism in which each player distributes his or her share of the fund as a reward to other members of the community [47]. The peer incentive also can be seen as a team incentive or group incentive, which compels team members to compete with one another and offers a prize to only the best performer in the end [50]. The peer incentives based on the unique characteristics of teams to stimulate interaction among team members are developed [54].…”

Section: Game Models Under Peer Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Li,

Gao,

2024

Sustainability

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With the increasingly serious problem of global climate change, many countries are positively promoting carbon-emission-reduction actions. In order to deeply explore the interaction between enterprises’ carbon-emission reduction and governments’ regulation, this paper builds evolutionary game models between governments and enterprises under the reward-and-punishment mechanism. The peer-incentive mechanism is introduced to incentivize enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and coordinate governments and enterprises. The evolutionary-stability strategies are obtained by solving the evolutionary game models. The stability of equilibrium points under different situations is theoretically and numerically studied. The results show that the existence of peer incentives makes enterprises more inclined to positively reduce carbon emissions and governments more inclined to positively regulate. A sufficiently large peer fund can always encourage enterprises to choose positive carbon-reduction emission strategies, while governments choose positive regulation strategies. Not only the increasing rewards and fines but also lowering regulatory costs will promote carbon-emission-reduction behaviors of enterprises. Peer incentives are more effective in promoting positive emission reduction of enterprises compared with rewards and punishments. This study can provide important guidance for governments to formulate regulatory strategies and for enterprises to formulate emission-reduction strategies.

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Section: Incentives and Penalties For Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Assumption 1 the Two Parties Of The Game Are The Government ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Game Models Under Peer Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Li,

Gao,

2024

Sustainability

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From Theory to Practice: Incentives for Managers and Professionals

Poljašević,

Berber

2024

Naše Gospodarstvo/Our Economy

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Although, in theory, a considerable amount of literature emphasizes the significance of employee incentive pay, there is not much empirical research indicating their dispersion in practice. The primary purpose of this study is to explore the level of implementation of various incentives in three countries: Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The research was conducted on a sample of 321 companies. Data for this study were extracted from the CRANET dataset. The latest data collection cycle was conducted in 2021-2022. In addition to descriptive statistics, the Pearson Chi-Square Test and Cramer’s V test were used to test hypotheses. The research results indicate a statistically significant difference in using most observed compensation elements among the observed countries. The study contributes to compensation management literature by presenting empirical data regarding the degree of implementation of various compensation instruments in three observed countries.

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Peer-dependent incentives and prepaid bonuses: An experimental investigation of productivity improvement

Cited by 2 publications

References 26 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

From Theory to Practice: Incentives for Managers and Professionals

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