Peasant conflict and the local predatory state in the Chinese countryside

Betting on the strong: Local government resource allocation in China's poverty counties

“…While the fiscal transfer system constrains overall resources, the target responsibility system incentivises local officials to seek the greatest returns on available resources. While this may discount the notion that the local state in China is inherently predatory or malign (Bernstein and Lu, 2000;So, 2007), the behaviour of the local state within this system nonetheless results in negative outcomes for poorer rural residents. However much the central state espouses its commitment to poverty alleviation, the environment it has created for its local officials to operate in runs counter to such intentions.…”

Failing entrepreneurial governance: From economic crisis to fiscal crisis in the city of Dongguan, China

“…Compared with other villages, this is a relatively poor village, which bears a much higher burden of public service spending. Because of the close connection between the local state and enterprises, rural enterprises could not operate as fully independent agents and were subject to 'predatory' claims from the collective governance body (So, 2007). Our study reveals that entrepreneurial governance has not developed a proper funding source for public services and has thus laid down the foundation of the predatory' behavior of the local state.…”

Comment: Primitive accumulation in modern China

“…Workers protested too when money-losing companies have laid them off or failed to pay their wages, health care expenses, and pensions. Indeed, hundreds and thousands of workers and peasants have risen up in protest every year since the 1980s (So 2006;So 2007b). These peasant and worker protests, nevertheless, tend to be localized, dispersed, short-term, and against the corrupted cadres of the local government rather than against the central party-state.…”