Peak Clock

Selmke, Bodo; Hauschild, Florian; Obermaier, Johannes

doi:10.1145/3338508.3359577

Cited by 13 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Frequency. Fault injection is possible by changing the frequency of the processor's clock, 8 ○ in to overclock using high-frequency signals [195]. Since the PLL generates the internal clock signal by modifying the input clock signal (multiplying or dividing the frequency by a factor), changing the frequency of the external clock for enough clock cycles will result in the PLL also adjusting its output clock signal.…”

Section: Hardware-based Faultmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electrical-Level Attacks on CPUs, FPGAs, and GPUs: Survey and Implications in the Heterogeneous Era

Mahmoud

Lenders²,

Stojilović

2022

ACM Comput. Surv.

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Given the need for efficient high-performance computing, computer architectures combining central processing units (CPUs), graphics processing units (GPUs), and field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are currently prevalent. However, each of these components suffers from electrical-level security risks. Moving to heterogeneous systems, with the potential of multitenancy, it is essential to understand and investigate how the security vulnerabilities of individual components may affect the system as a whole. In this work, we provide a survey on the electrical-level attacks on CPUs, FPGAs, and GPUs. Additionally, we discuss whether these attacks can extend to heterogeneous systems and highlight open research directions for ensuring the security of heterogeneous computing systems in the future.

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Section: Hardware-based Faultmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electrical-Level Attacks on CPUs, FPGAs, and GPUs: Survey and Implications in the Heterogeneous Era

Mahmoud

Lenders²,

Stojilović

2022

ACM Comput. Surv.

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“…There are various practical techniques for generating a faulty clock signal [11,17,19,27,29,[37][38][39][40][41]48,49]. All of the proposed methods call for a high-frequency clock signal, the so-called 'Nominal Clock' on the clock fault generator side.…”

Section: A Review Of Previously Proposed Clock Glitch Generatorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review on Evaluation and Configuration of Fault Injection Attack Instruments to Design Attack Resistant MCU-Based IoT Applications

et al. 2020

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The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has gained significant importance in all aspects of daily life, and there are many areas of application for it. Despite the rate of expansion and the development of infrastructure, such systems also bring new concerns and challenges. Security and privacy are at the top of the list and must be carefully considered by designers and manufacturers. Not only do the devices need to be protected against software and network-based attacks, but proper attention must also be paid to recently emerging hardware-based attacks. However, low-cost unit software developers are not always sufficiently aware of existing vulnerabilities due to these kinds of attacks. To tackle the issue, various platforms are proposed to enable rapid and easy evaluation against physical attacks. Fault attacks are the noticeable type of physical attacks, in which the normal and secure behavior of the targeted devices is liable to be jeopardized. Indeed, such attacks can cause serious malfunctions in the underlying applications. Various studies have been conducted in other research works related to the different aspects of fault injection. Two of the primary means of fault attacks are clock and voltage fault injection. These attacks can be performed with a moderate level of knowledge, utilizing low-cost facilities to target IoT systems. In this paper, we explore the main parameters of the clock and voltage fault generators. This can help hardware security specialists to develop an open-source platform and to evaluate their design against such attacks. The principal concepts of both methods are studied for this purpose. Thereafter, we conclude our paper with the need for such an evaluation platform in the design and production cycle of embedded systems and IoT devices.

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“…All fault injection methods temporarily disturb the physical runtime environment of the Device under Test (DuT) to cause specific misbehavior. Common FI attacks are, e.g., conducted by disturbing the supply voltage [3], generating malicious clock signals [49], rapidly changing the electromagnetic environment [28], or inducing a light pulse at the decapsulated Integrated Circuits (ICs) [59]. The possible consequences from injecting a certain type of fault are described by a FI method's Fault Model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oops..! I Glitched It Again! How to Multi-Glitch the Glitching-Protections on ARM TrustZone-M

Saß¹,

Mitev²,

Sadeghi³

2023

Preprint

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Voltage Fault Injection (VFI), also known as power glitching, has proven to be a severe threat to real-world systems. In VFI attacks, the adversary disturbs the power-supply of the target-device forcing the device to illegitimate behavior. Various countermeasures have been proposed to address different types of fault injection attacks at different abstraction layers, either requiring to modify the underlying hardware or software/firmware at the machine instruction level. Moreover, only recently, individual chip manufacturers have started to respond to this threat by integrating countermeasures in their products. Generally, these countermeasures aim at protecting against single fault injection (SFI) attacks, since Multiple Fault Injection (MFI) is believed to be challenging and sometimes even impractical. In this paper, we present µ-Glitch, the first Voltage Fault Injection (VFI) platform which is capable of injecting multiple, coordinated voltage faults into a target device, requiring only a single trigger signal. We provide a novel flow for Multiple Voltage Fault Injection (MVFI) attacks to significantly reduce the search complexity for fault parameters, as the search space increases exponentially with each additional fault injection. We evaluate and showcase the effectiveness and practicality of our attack platform on four real-world chips, featuring TrustZone-M: The first two have interdependent backchecking mechanisms, while the second two have additionally integrated countermeasures against fault injection. Our evaluation revealed that µ-Glitch can successfully inject four consecutive faults within an average time of one day. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures to mitigate VFI attacks and additionally propose two novel attack scenarios for MVFI.

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Peak Clock

Cited by 13 publications

References 8 publications

Electrical-Level Attacks on CPUs, FPGAs, and GPUs: Survey and Implications in the Heterogeneous Era

Electrical-Level Attacks on CPUs, FPGAs, and GPUs: Survey and Implications in the Heterogeneous Era

A Review on Evaluation and Configuration of Fault Injection Attack Instruments to Design Attack Resistant MCU-Based IoT Applications

Oops..! I Glitched It Again! How to Multi-Glitch the Glitching-Protections on ARM TrustZone-M

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