Peacocke’s trees

Abstract

In Sense and Content, Christopher Peacocke points out that two equallysized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke's arguments for separatism-the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences are independent of one another. However, despite its notoriety, the argument is widely misunderstood and underappreciated. I argue that once the structure of the argument is clarified and the replies that have been offered are considered closely, one must conclude that the trees argument is successful.

Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts

“…Millar (2010) and an anonymous referee point out that Peacocke explicitly denies trying to refute the representationalist supervenience claim with this example (see Peacocke 1983, 13). But the example has nevertheless often been interpreted in this way, as Millar notes (see, for example Lycan 1996; Tye 1996; Chalmers 2004).…”

Representationalism and the perspectival character of perceptual experience

“…12 Peacocke's example has received much attention in the literature. For a summary and illuminating discussion, see Millar (2010). 13 Peacocke defines sensational properties as follows: ''The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject.…”