2015
DOI: 10.1111/misr.12205
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Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment

Abstract: A rich literature has developed focusing on the efficacy of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in a temporal sense—asking whether the periods following a deployment are more peaceful or not. We know less about the efficacy of PKOs in a spatial sense. Can peacekeeping shape the geographic dispersion of particular episodes of violence? We posit that PKOs can contain conflict by decreasing the tactical advantage of mobility for the rebels, by obstructing the movement of armed actors, and by altering the ability for g… Show more

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Cited by 66 publications
(42 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, the authorization of sanctions against a state in one context is a credible signal that the UNSC is sufficiently motivated to use this tool to address a security concern in that state, and government and dissident actors in an indirectly related SD dispute are likely to update their expectations to anticipate being the target of additional sanctions if they 35 This argument is in line with expectations of the literature on peacekeeping (e.g., Fortna 2004Fortna , 2008. 36 Related, Beardsley (2011) finds that peacekeeping prevents the spread of conflict across state borders, and Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) find that conflict zones are less mobile in countries with peacekeeping deployments. 37 Minorities at Risk 2009. escalate their dispute to armed conflict.…”
Section: Direct Vs Indirect Engagementmentioning
confidence: 60%
“…Moreover, the authorization of sanctions against a state in one context is a credible signal that the UNSC is sufficiently motivated to use this tool to address a security concern in that state, and government and dissident actors in an indirectly related SD dispute are likely to update their expectations to anticipate being the target of additional sanctions if they 35 This argument is in line with expectations of the literature on peacekeeping (e.g., Fortna 2004Fortna , 2008. 36 Related, Beardsley (2011) finds that peacekeeping prevents the spread of conflict across state borders, and Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) find that conflict zones are less mobile in countries with peacekeeping deployments. 37 Minorities at Risk 2009. escalate their dispute to armed conflict.…”
Section: Direct Vs Indirect Engagementmentioning
confidence: 60%
“…Kelmendi and Radin (2016) indicate that satisfaction with UN peacekeepers in Kosovo depends on the perception that the UN mission furthers the agenda of one's own ethnic group. Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) and Reiter (2015) show that peacekeepers' interventions may increase the legitimacy of hostile groups that undermine the peace, and Doyle and Sambanis, 2000;Nilsson and Kovacs (2011);and Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014) (2008) and Costalli (2014) find UN peacekeepers are short-term solutions to conflict, and may not serve to predict or prevent subsequent violence. Mironova and Whitt (2017) express concern about the sustainability of positive peace once peacekeepers depart.…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Existing research agrees that peacekeeping works because it reduces the lethality, duration, and diffusion of civil wars (Beardsley and Gleditsch ; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri ; Fortna ; Gilligan and Sergenti ; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon , ). This scholarship, however, focuses on violence perpetrated by armed political actors and largely neglects violence perpetrated by nonpolitically motivated actors—above all, criminal actors.…”
mentioning
confidence: 94%