Peacekeeping and Conformity with Human Rights Law: How MINUSTAH Falls Short in Haiti

Howland, Todd

doi:10.1080/13533310600988671

Cited by 12 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The UN’s increasing tendency to integrate human rights components into the institutional framework of a peacekeeping operation has generated the – in some cases well-founded – fear that human rights would be further marginalized in the operation’s activities (e.g. Howland, 2006; Månsson, 2006). Also within MONUSCO, there were attempts to marginalize the work of the human rights component (Mahoney and Nash, 2012: 16).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperating with evil? Accountability in peace operations and the evolution of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

Hirschmann¹

2019

Cooperation and Conflict

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International organizations (IOs) usually cooperate with national actors in order to implement global decisions and policies. This cooperation has become problematic as implementing partners have increasingly been accused of serious human rights violations. This article analyzes how implementing partners from the host state of a United Nations (UN) peace operation are held accountable. I argue that the complexity of contemporary peacekeeping limits the availability of traditional accountability mechanisms. I develop a conceptual model to demonstrate how, instead, different accountability forms interact and complement each other. I illustrate this interplay of accountability with a case study on the emergence of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). The accountability framework enacted by the Joint Human Rights Unit, the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court in the context of the UN peace operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo threatened the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping. As a consequence, the UN adopted the HRDDP as a new, UN-based accountability mechanism to hold implementing partners from the host state of peace operations accountable.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperating with evil? Accountability in peace operations and the evolution of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

Hirschmann¹

2019

Cooperation and Conflict

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“…Other interlocutors such as Chile, France, and Canada including those who challenged the intervention such as Argentina, CARICOM, and Brazil's domestic public accepted the authority of the UN, resolved to work within its institutional mandate, and rejected any possibility of unilateral humanitarian intervention in Haiti 15 . CARICOM relied on the institutional support of the OAS and submitted a formal request to the UN to end the violence in Haiti and restore the political position of Aristide (Bravo 2005; Howland 2006, 470) 16 . Similarly, the administration in Brazil deferred to the UN Secretary-General Report on Haiti in seeking entitlement for engaging in Haitian reconstruction 17 .…”

Section: Brazil's Un Chapter VII Peace Enforcement Military Intervementioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of political rhetorical reasoning: norm types, scorekeepers, and political projects

Sundaram

2019

Int. Theory

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How does rhetoric work in the pursuit of political projects in international relations? This article analyzes how rhetoric-wielding political actors engage in reasoning to bolster their position by drawing upon norms that underwrite interactions, and audiences as scorekeepers evaluate the reasoning by making a series of inferences. I call this mechanism rhetorical reasoning. Building on the existing classification of norms in constructivist international relations (IR) and utilizing three distinct norm types – instrumental, institutional, and moral – I show the different processes through which political actors deploy rhetoric to legitimize and justify political projects and the distinct logics through which scorekeepers make inferences and evaluate the project. This article contributes to IR theories of argumentation by providing a sharp conceptualization of political rhetoric and actor–audience relationships in the game. I illustrate the mechanism of rhetorical reasoning using Brazil's UN peace enforcement operation in Haiti in 2004 to give empirical evidence for the role of institutional norm type in patterns of rhetorical reasoning and contestations in international politics. Paying attention to political rhetoric in the actor–scorekeepers' relationships in this way clarifies important issues regarding the varieties of political projects and the different role of normativity in the game.

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UN Peacekeeping and the Protection of Bodily Integrity Rights: When Protectors Become Perpetrators

Hirschmann¹

2017

Protecting the Individual From International Authority

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Peacekeeping and Conformity with Human Rights Law: How MINUSTAH Falls Short in Haiti

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Cooperating with evil? Accountability in peace operations and the evolution of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

Cooperating with evil? Accountability in peace operations and the evolution of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

Varieties of political rhetorical reasoning: norm types, scorekeepers, and political projects

UN Peacekeeping and the Protection of Bodily Integrity Rights: When Protectors Become Perpetrators

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