Peace processes and Northern Ireland: Squaring circles?

Dingley, James

doi:10.1080/09546559908427515

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 6 publications

(1 reference statement)

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“…While it is disputed whether the PIRA passed on intelligence to the police in order to undermine the RIRA it is known that the PIRA undertook its own crackdown against extremist factions within the Republican movement. Indeed, the Provisionals threatened RIRA and CIRA members with execution if they did not respect PIRA ceasefires (Dingley 1999). In February and March of 1998 the police prevented five major bombings, including a 1300 lb.…”

Section: The Plo Hamas and Islamic Jihad: Counter-terror Fails And mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence

Mesquita¹

2005

Int. Org.

101

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When governments offer concessions to an ideologically heterogeneous terrorist organization the moderates within that organization are most likely to accept the concessions. Consequently, the terrorist organization is left in the hands of extremists following concessions, leading to an increase in militantism and potentially in terrorist violence. However, governments often also require former terrorists to collaborate in counter-terrorism efforts, which improves the governments chances of eradicating terror entirely. I examine patterns of terrorist violence, government concessions, and counter-terrorism policy in five case studies: Basque separatists in Spain, Palestinian extremists, Irish Republican terrorists, Quebec separatists in Canada, and Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine. The contribution of these case studies is twofold. First, they demonstrate that the proposed theoretical framework is an empirically useful conceptualization of the politics of terrorism. Second, and more importantly, I present a theoretically informed analysis of significant historical incidents of terrorism in an effort to shed light on the organizational and political dynamics underlying patterns of terrorist violence. This historical analysis demonstrates that, despite variance in government strategy, terrorist responses, and patterns of violence, all five case studies can be understood within a single theoretical framework. A Comparative Study of Five CasesGovernments employ an array of strategies in their efforts to put an end to armed insurgency and terrorism. The twentieth century has witnessed government responses as varied as acquiescence, peace negotiations that include concessions to terrorists, and military crackdowns. Consider, for instance, the French withdrawal from Algeria, the Spanish granting of partial autonomy to Basque separatists, the Israeli negotiations with the Palestinians followed by a renewed focus on counter-terror, and the Russian refusal to negotiate with the Chechneyans coupled with a brutal military assault. This multiplicity of government reactions raises important questions for students of terrorism. Can granting concessions to terrorists resolve violent conflict? Why do governments simultaneously pursue both conciliatory and counter-insurgency strategies? What factors affect government and insurgent strategies and the level of political violence? These are the questions that motivate this study.I examine patterns of terrorist violence, government concessions, and counter-terrorism policy in five case studies: the Basque separatists in Spain, Palestinian extremists, the Irish Republican Army and its splinter groups, the Quebec separatists in Canada, and the Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine. These case studies, as explained in greater detail later, are selected to probe theoretical claims deduced from a formal model of terrorist/government negotiations. In an earlier study I suggested a model that addresses how government concessions can cause terrorist organizati...

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Section: The Plo Hamas and Islamic Jihad: Counter-terror Fails And mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the PLO (Bell 1998). The CIRA, however, did not engage in its first act of terror until 1996, when it was part of an internal Irish Republican disagreement that led to the breaking of a cease-fire signed in 1994 (Dingley 1999). …”

Section: The Plo Hamas and Islamic Jihad: Counter-terror Fails And mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence

Mesquita¹

2005

Int. Org.

101

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“…Over the last decade -and -a -half, several positive steps have occurred in the longstanding confl ict (Dingley, 1999 ). In 1985, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland signed a peace agreement regarding the governance of Northern Ireland.…”

Section: Provisional Irish Republican Army ( Pira )mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Primacy of Grievance as a Structural Cause of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Comparing Al Fatah, FARC, and PIRA

Ross¹

2009

The Faces of Terrorism

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Synopsis: This chapter applies the structural components of a previously developed causal model to three well -known and different campaigns of oppositional political terrorism: Al -Fatah, FARC, and PIRA. By doing so, the reader will have a better understanding of the causal dynamics of oppositional political terrorism. After the history of each group is provided, each of 10 basic structural factors is applied to the terrorist organizations. The evidence points to the powerful and longstanding effects of grievance to sustain the longevity of the group.

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“…1 It therefore has distinct connotations in Northern Ireland as a Republican concept. It must also be remembered that it is Republicans who have been the primary instigators of the violence in the Province.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They are the hook that has caught democratic politicians. 89 They have followed the letter of the Agreement, as they correctly observe, but they have also been able to turn it on its head and the two most extreme parties now occupy centre stage. The traditional major constitutional parties and the ones most ready to sign up to the Agreement and enthusiastic about toleration, the UUP and SDLP, will become minority parties playing only a minor role, while the avowedly cross-community Alliance Party has almost sunk without trace.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%