Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics

Weart, Spencer R.

doi:10.1177/0022343394031003005

Cited by 54 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The elimination of structural hierarchies, which are supported by norms of violence and oppression, should, therefore, result in less violence both domestically and internationally as norms of equality and non-violence are transferred to the international arena (Weart, 1994). Although the state has the power to minimize domestic inequalities, and thus to undermine structural inequalities, some states instead exacerbate these inequalities and power hierarchies through formal policies of state repression.…”

Section: Structural Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying `Rogue' States and Testing their Interstate Conflict Behavior

Caprioli

Trumbore

2003

European Journal of International Relations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We explore and define the concept of a 'rogue' state based on a state's domestic patterns of behavior. We combine measures of domestic gender equality, ethnic discrimination and state repression to identify characteristics of rogue states. Once we have identified rogue states, we perform logistic regression to predict whether rogue states are more likely to be the aggressors during international disputes -whether they are more likely to use force first during interstate conflict, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. This research adds to a growing body of scholarship in International Relations regarding the behavior of states involved in conflict, which demonstrates that states with higher levels of inequality, repression and violence exhibit higher levels of violence during international disputes and during international crises. This argument is most fully developed within feminist scholarship; however, research in the field of ethnopolitical conflict has also highlighted the negative impact of domestic discrimination and violence on state behavior at the international level.

show abstract

Section: Structural Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying `Rogue' States and Testing their Interstate Conflict Behavior

Caprioli

Trumbore

2003

European Journal of International Relations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The finding that democracies, while apparently engaging in war no less frequently than other states, seldom if ever fight one another is generally considered robust (Levy, 1989:270; Bremer, 1992; Ray, 1993, 1998; Weart, 1994:299, 1998; Russett and Oneal, 2001). When it comes to explaining it, however, there is considerable disagreement (Hagan, 1994:185–86).…”

Section: Explaining Democratic Peacementioning

confidence: 99%

The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception

Farnham

2003

Int Studies Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's assessment of Hitler as a potential threat to American security in the aftermath of the Munich crisis highlights the role of liberal‐democratic norms in shaping the threat perceptions of democratic leaders. A critical factor in Roosevelt's post‐Munich expectation of future trouble for the United States was his judgment that Hitler's contempt for democratic processes of accommodation forecasted unlimited aims. Since Roosevelt did not link his perception of threat to regime type, however, this episode also calls into question a central tenet of the theory of democratic peace: the notion that democracies invariably harbor a “presumption of enmity” toward nondemocracies. Nevertheless, the Munich case allows us to see which democratic norms do matter in threat perception and establishes that they are not simply the epiphenomena of state interests. Moreover, Roosevelt's response to the Munich crisis shows that threat can be assessed primarily on the basis of intentions and suggests how democratic predispositions can provide indicators of intent. Finally, in analyzing why some democratic leaders derive diagnostic information about aggressive intentions from such indicators, while others do not, this article explores the connection between different leaders' perceptions and the foreign policy processes of democratic states.

show abstract

“…With a few exceptions (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989;Weart, 1994;Leeds and Davis, 1995), most scholars have found that only democratic states share a special relationship, leading them to focus on characteristics unique to democracies like democratic norms or institutional constraints. However, if autocracies also favor 19 In the twentieth century, differences on the scope variable ranged from zero, suggesting very similar economic structures, to eight, suggesting large differences in economic institutions.…”

Section: Implications and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices

Werner

Lemke

1997

Int Studies Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider the effect of the disputants' power, political and economic institutional similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to 1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional similarities matter to the aligning state's decision. We also find that power concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the international system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity generally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.The foreign policy choices of states can provide important information about the preferences of state leaders. Few foreign policy choices are as revealing as the decision to align with one side over another in an ongoing dispute. Even more than a formal alliance, actually siding with a disputant reveals a clear preference for one International Studies Quarterly (1997) 41, 529-546

show abstract

Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics

Cited by 54 publications

References 25 publications

Identifying `Rogue' States and Testing their Interstate Conflict Behavior

Identifying `Rogue' States and Testing their Interstate Conflict Behavior

The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception

Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About