PBIM: A Participant Based Incentive Mechanism for Consortium Chain

Liu, Wenyan; Song, Xiaolin; Kong, Lanju

doi:10.1109/cscwd54268.2022.9776108

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…It belongs to a branch of game theory. Common incentive mechanisms can be categorized into three types: reputation-based mechanisms [15], tit-for-tat mechanisms [21], and monetary mechanisms [13]. Reputation-based mechanisms aim to identify selfish nodes and impose penalties on them.…”

Section: Incentive Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By designing blockchain incentive mechanisms, user behavior can be effectively changed. In different scenarios, there have been many works on incentive mechanisms based on blockchain [13][14][15]. This paper mainly presents a fusion architecture of the blockchain and ICN network and designs corresponding incentive mechanisms to encourage users to contribute their idle bandwidth to the ICN network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Utilizing User Bandwidth Resources in Information-Centric Networking through Blockchain-Based Incentive Mechanism

Liu,

Han,

2023

Future Internet

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Idle bandwidth resources are inefficiently distributed among different users. Currently, the utilization of user bandwidth resources mostly relies on traditional IP networks, implementing relevant techniques at the application layer, which creates scalability issues and brings additional system overheads. Information-Centric Networking (ICN), based on the idea of separating identifiers and locators, offers the potential to aggregate idle bandwidth resources from a network layer perspective. This paper proposes a method for utilizing user bandwidth resources in ICN; specifically, we treat the use of user bandwidth resources as a service and assign service IDs (identifiers), and when network congestion (the network nodes are overloaded) occurs, the traffic can be routed to the user side for forwarding through the ID/NA (Network Address) cooperative routing mechanism of ICN, thereby improving the scalability of ICN transmission and the utilization of underlying network resources. To enhance the willingness of users to contribute idle bandwidth resources, we establish a secure and trustworthy bandwidth trading market using blockchain technology. We also design an incentive mechanism based on the Proof-of-Network-Contribution (PoNC) consensus algorithm; users can “mine” by forwarding packets. The experimental results show that utilizing idle bandwidth can significantly improve the scalability of ICN transmission under experimental conditions, bringing a maximum throughput improvement of 19.4% and reducing the packet loss rate. Compared with existing methods, using ICN technology to aggregate idle bandwidth for network transmission will have a more stable and lower latency, and it brings a maximum utilization improvement of 13.7%.

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Section: Incentive Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Utilizing User Bandwidth Resources in Information-Centric Networking through Blockchain-Based Incentive Mechanism

Liu,

Han,

2023

Future Internet

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“…Many scholars have started developing multistage cooperation incentive systems that consider the reputation effect. 30,31 In addition, a new entrance point for contemporary research has emerged in the regular employment of contract-and reputationbased incentives. Zhang and Zhang 32 constructed a two-stage dynamic incentive model combining dual reputation incentives and explicit incentives for Building Information Modeling application.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multi-stage Dynamic Incentive Model for Construction Project Managers From the Perspective of Work-Family Conflict

Lin

Sun

2023

J Occup Environ Med

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This study aims to design incentives for organizations to improve the work engagement of construction project managers (CPMs) when they experience work-family conflict. Methods: Based on principal-agent theory, a multistage dynamic incentive model for CPMs' work engagement under the perspective of work-family conflict is constructed by integrating contract and reputation effect incentive mechanisms. Then MATLAB software was used to simulate the theoretical model for the arithmetic example. Finally, 182 valid questionnaires were tested for the conclusions of the model. Results: In the two stages of the incentive model, work resources significantly positively influence CPMs' work engagement, and work-family conflict harms CPMs' work engagement. Including a reputation mechanism has two effects on the first stage of the incentive model. First, reputation has an incentive effect on CPMs' work engagement. Second, it reduces the negative impact of work-family conflict on work engagement. The combination of contract-and reputation-based incentives will improve CPMs' work engagement. Conclusions: The results suggest that incentives targeted at increasing the work engagement of CPMs may be necessary.

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